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PREFACE

Electronic communication remained captive of wire for more than a
half century before a technique could be found to set it free.

A major

breakthrough in electronic communication occurred in 1873 when James
Clerk-Maxwell published A Treatise on Electricity & Magnetism in which
he established the theory of electromagnetic energy, supported by mathe
matical proofs and based on observation of visible light.^

Within a

decade experiments conducted by Heinrich Hertz which confirmed Maxwell’s
concepts served as the scientific basis for the first radio transmissions.
Radio telephone instruments were perfected by the inventor Guglielmo
Marconi which stimulated experiments in similar areas of wireless trans
mission.

By 1907 Lee de Forest had patented the vacuum-tube which set

the stage for television broadcasting.

Within two decades an entertain

ment/information industry began to form around this new technology.

Now,

a half century later, radio and television stations have access to nearly
every American family.

Yet, in this time of spiraling scientific ad

vances the broadcast industry faces a new challenge, not from a more
complex mode of electronic signal dissemination, but from a system
which has returned to wire to deliver its message.

This is but one

paradox in the maze or contradictions known as community antenna tele
vision (CATV).
\

Cable television began in 1949^ when television repairmen in the
mountainous areas of Pennsylvania and Oregon, attempting to gain clearer

^Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America, 2nd ed. (New Yorki
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 117.

TV reception, fed distant television signals into rural areas normally
out of the signal's range,

A master antenna apparatus was erected to

receive television signals which were amplified and distributed to sub
scribers through a network of coaxial cables--wires capable of transmi tting high frequency signals.
The Federal Communications Commission began efforts to determine
proper legal categories for various cable television operations in 1952,
continuing these attempts on an intermittent basis until 1959 without
notable success.

The failure of the FCC to settle upon a single suc

cinct statement either categorizing CATV within an existing legal term
or to create a new category with clearly defined legal attributes left
a jurisprudential vacuum the courts were forced to fill.

Cable tele

vision is simple to explain in terms of basic function but very difficult
to define in terms of economic implications, especially as its activities
intermesh with the broadcasting industry.

Essentially, it is an audience

or subscriber-financed method of enhancing and expanding reception of
existing television programming.

This single factor of public support

rather than advertiser support has stimulated the major controversies
about present cable operations and has generated both the highest hopes
and greatest fears about its ultimate potential.
CATV has been described as a parasite industry sapping
program creativity, and a broadcast ally enhancing pro
gram diversity; an alien concept threatening our free sys
tem of communication, and a salutory force allowing
minority opinions public access..2
2

Don Le Due, Community Antenna Television as a Challenger of
Broadcast Regulatory* Policy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970), p. 2.

The author became interested in cable television over two years
ago while working as local program origination assistant at a major
cable company in northern California.

Several ideas were discussed as

to what types of local programming should be offered to adequately
serve a town comprised of various population groups.

This sparked per

sonal interest in the common carrier/public access issue.
Through broadcasting history regulatory problems have been crucial.
This study will examine one facet of the Federal Communication Commis
TV
sion's efforts to classify the numerous legal aspects of^CATV in rela
tion to the economic and technological transitions inherent in the
industry, specifically the issue of regulating cable television sys
tems as common carriers.
complex.

Presently, CATV is suffering from an identity

Does a cable operation fit into the category of a broadcast

station as we now know it, is it a common carrier or is a new
classification warranted?
This study will begin with a historical examination of the dif
ficulty of pinpointing a definition of common carrier.

CATV common

carrier operations will be discussed in relation to technological
feasibility, economic factors and possible programming conflicts.
Although it may be impossible to discover a concise answer or formula,
an attempt will be made to provide a basis for policy decisions and
future projections.

It is unquestionably a difficult task to define

and classify essential legal elements of an organization in process of
both economic and technological transition but ambiguity at this basic
level can only increase the difficulty of making intelligent decisions
at a more complex stage of regulatory deliberation.

The author wishes to acknowledge the time and assistance of com
mittee members, Dr. Dennis Fus and Dr. Orville Menard.

Special grati

tude goes to Dr. Mary Williamson, thesis advisor, for her counsel and
encouragement throughout graduate study.
There are three persons whose influence and contributions to thi
effort cannot be adequately expressed within the formal style of an
acknowledgment.
The first is Bill White whose enthusiasm and support encouraged
this author to pursue graduate study.
The other two are the author's parents, Mr. and Mrs. William
Henderson, whose faith and understanding have made attainment of this
personal goal possible.
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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMMON CARRIER DOCTRINE

The evolution of the Western World's economy into a corporate
structure with large-scale finance and production has altered the com
mon carrier concept.

In the early days the common carrier was a

hoyman or a tailor, but the technological revolution of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuriesTnade it possible to construct large ocean
vessels, railways and airplanes, thereby raising the question whether
the common carrier doctrine also applied to these new industries.^
The. concept of the common carrier in legal application has several
facets still frequently used and applied in different connections, but
fts precise meaning is rarely made clear.

The complexity of common

carrier doctrine results from a diversity of events that have confronted
and influenced each other during a long period of time.
The most frequent definition of this concept designates a common
carrier to be one who holds himself out to the public in general to
carry for them in return for compensation.

One of the regulations is

that the common carrier may not pick and choose among his customers
but has to serve them all without discrimination.

Secondly, a common

carrier can only demand a reasonable fee in return for reasonable
.
2
service.

^Lars Gorton, The Concept of the Common Carrier in Anglo-American
Law (Gothenburg, Sweden: Akademiforlaget, 197l), pi 22.
Russell E. Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 92.

2

*

Perhaps this definition sufficed at a time when no notices or
special contracts were used, notices limiting the sphere of the carrier's
profession to certain routes, to certain classes of goods and notices
limiting the carrier's liability.

Now, though, this definition seems

less precise and "it becomes difficult to distinguish the prerequisites
for being a common carrier from the consequences of being one."

3

Through the mixture of ideas that join together in the
common carrier concept one may reach the definition
that "he is a common carrier who is a common carrier,"
for he who holds himself out to the general public is
a common carrier, and he who is a common carrier must
hold himself out to carry for anybody who chooses to
use him. This circular reasoning is imprecise and un
satisfactory but the mentioned definition still seems
to be the accepted one.4
The difficulty of pinpointing a definition of common carrier can
be understood by tracing the modification of this doctrine and its
changing applicability to different industries.

The term "common

carrier" did not appear until the late 1800's but the concept
originated in the Middle Ages with the concept of "common callings."
Common callings developed under the guild system in England and
related to activities considered essential to community life which
were undertaken by those who were given specific authorization to do
so.

These activities were related to the public interest and those

who performed such services were not only subject to special obliga
tions but could also be regulated by the Crown even though a special
grant of monopoly privilege had been afforded.

Historians disagree

Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 11.
^Ibid.

3

as to which public occupations fell within the jurisdiction of common
callings.

Persons regarded as exercising a public employment included

carriers, innkeepers, surgeons, smiths, farriers, tailors, ferrymen,
sheriffs, taverners, victuallers and gaolers.

5

A few historians have

questioned whether smiths were common callers, while other historians
have excluded carriers in their discussion.

Liability Issue Obligates Common Carriers
To Deliver Goods Safely
Although specific guidelines for liability were not established
until 1703, early common callers were required to perform their ser
vices in good faith and trust, under the law of bailment.*
The liability arose from the fact of a person holding
a definite status to which the liability was annexed
by law, and the skill required in different callings
together with the corresponding degree of responsibility
varied with the different species of employment. Thus
the gaoler warranted against a breaking of the gaol,
but not against fire; the smith warranted against
pricking the horse; the innkeepers against theft but
not against other sorts of injury; the carriers against
theft on the road but probably not against theft at the
inn. It will be observed that in no case did the ob
ligation implied by law amount to an obligation to
insure against all events.6
In the early law there was no difference between private carriers
and common carriers and the liability of all carriers had as a common
source the status of bailees.

This status created a liability indepen

dent of any compensation or contract.

Usually common carriers were

^Ibid., p. 25.
^Ibid., pp. 25-26.
*A delivery of goods or money by one person to another in trust,
for some special purpose, upon a contract, expressed or implied, that
the trust shall be faithfully executed.

regarded as those who "held out" to carry for everyone, while private
carriers entered into business with particular persons.

Under the

English common law "a carrier is a person who carries goods or passen
gers whether for reward or not, by land or by w a t e r . Y e t

this

definition did not say whether the carrier is he who undertakes the
transport or he who actually performs it.
The 16th and 17th centuries were a period of confusion in legal
theory.

The development of contracts seemed to clarify the definition

of common carrier by specifying that the promise to carry was a prerequiste for being a carrier.

But the issue of liability became

muddled in conflicting doctrines.

A few historians proposed that a

carrier was liable only if he demanded a charge.

Others claimed that

a common carrier may always demand a reasonable charge and he is not
obligated to carry under any non-payment arrangements; but if a common
carrier does agree to carry without charge, his liability may be less
restrictive.

8

Coggs v. Bernard (1705) has been regarded as one of the

most important cases in establishing the common carrier liability.

9

The case concerned the defendant Bernard who undertook to carry cases
of brandy from one cellar to another.

One of the cases broke, according

to the plaintiff, through the negligence of the defendant.

Regarding

the common law liability of carriers, the decision read in part:

7

Ibid., p. 53.
O
Olsen v. Draper, 112 F. Supp., 1953, p. 859.
9
Orville Holmes, The Common Law, ed. by M. D. Howe (Cambridge,
Mass: 1963), p. 155.

5

. . . a delivery to carry or otherwise manage, for a
reward to be paid to the bailee, those cases are of two
sorts; either a delivery to one that exercises a public
employment, or a delivery to a private person. First
if it be to a person of the first sort, and he is to
have a reward, he is bound to answer for the goods at all
events. And this is the case of the common carrier,
common hoyman, master of a ship, etc: . . . The law
charges this person thus intrusted to carry goods,
against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies
of the king . . . . And this a politic establishment,
contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of
all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige
them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be
safe in their ways of dealing.
Two main principles can be derived from this opinion; a) that a
person who exercises a public employment is a common carrier and b)
that a common carrier carrying goods for charge has a liability for
the safety of the goods, with the only exception being an act of God
or the king’s enemies.

This decision differentiated between the

liability of a private carrier, now liable as an "ordinary” bailee for
negligence only, and the common carrier with his severe and twofold
liability.^

This seemingly simple clarification is nevertheless

important in order to understand the later evolution of the common
carrier doctrine.

The issue of liability has been an important one

throughout the history of common carriers.

This study will reveal

that this issue, although in a different context, is a major point
of controversy between cable television operators and common carrier
access advocates.

^Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 59.
^ Ibid., p. 66

6

Common carriers were subject to absolute liability for loss of or
damage to goods (sometimes termed strict liability), whereas the
ordinary bailee was granted the possibility of contracting out of his
liability.

The theory of contract was probably the most far-reaching

aspect of the Coggs v. Bernard case.

"Originally the relation between

the carrier and his customers was thus not founded on contract but on
the law of bailment."

12

In the law of bailment the obligations of the

parties were fixed beforehand by law.

The use of contracts allowed

the parties to agree to their respective obligations and immunities
governed only by court rulings that prohibited relieving a carrier
from liability for gross negligence.
The subsequent evolution of the common carrier doctrine was by no
means unambiguous.

It is difficult to clarify and structure the elements

to formulate a precise doctrine or definition.

The concept has under

gone several changes; the common callers of the Middle Ages were very
different from the common carriers of the twentieth century.
It is not always easy to determine to which class a
particular carrier belongs for they rarely put their
profession formally into writing though sometimes
they give public notice that they are not Common
Carriers of certain goods and so it generally has to
be decided from their past conduct, the types of vehicles
they use and the other surrounding circumstances
. . . . but as long as a carrier is a Common Carrier
he is in two quite different respects under a serious
legal liability; one is his obligation to carry and
the other is his liability for any loss or injury to
the goods while in the course of carriage.13

12Ibid., p. 68.
13Ibid., p. 69.

7

Supreme Court Establishes Legal Foundation
For Carrier Liability in Niagara v. Cordes
It was over a century after the Coggs v. Bernard case that the
United States Supreme Court thoroughly considered the common carrier
issue and gave an exhaustive description of it in Niagara v. Cordes

14

saying in part:
A common carrier is one who undertakes for hire to trans
port the goods of those who may choose to employ him from
place to place. He is, in general, bound to take the
goods of all who offer, unless his complement for the
trip is full, or the goods be of such a kind as to be
liable to extraordinary danger, or such as he is unaccus
tomed to convey.
In all cases where there is no special
agreement to the contrary, he is entitled to demand the
price of carriage before he receives the goods; and if
not paid, he may refuse to receive them; but if he take
charge of them for transportation, the non-payment of
the price of carriage in advance will not discharge,
affect or lessen his liability as a carrier in the case,
and he may afterwards recover the price of the service
performed. When he receives the goods, it is his duty
to take all possible care of them in their passage, make
due transport and safe and right delivery of them at the
time agreed upon . . . . Common carriers are usually
described as of two kinds, namely carriers by land and
carriers by water. At common law, a carrier by land is
in the nature of an insurer and is bound to keep and
carry the goods entrusted to his care safely, and is
liable for all losses, and in all events, unless he can
prove that the loss happened from the act of God, or
the public enemy, or by the act of the owner of the goods.
This extensive description emphasizes the complexity of the common
carrier doctrine.

The Court makes it evident that there is no simple

definition that can be applied to common carriers, instead the Court
seems to point out its intricate nature.

Nevertheless there seem

be two basic principles that characterize a common carrier:

to

a) dis

tinction between the private and the common carrier points out the

14

The Propeller Niagara v. Joseph H. Cordes. 62 U.S., 1858, p. 7.

two main liabilities of the latter, one concerning the refusal to carry
and the other regarding loss of or damage to goods;

15

b) "holds itself

out" to the public as willing to carry all passengers and/or goods for
hire indiscriminately.^

Willingness of the Shipping Industry to Safely Carry Goods
For Hire Results in Common Carrier Status
If the task of defining common carrier seemed difficult to the
various judicial bodies, the task of determining which carriers were
to be regarded as common carriers must have seemed insurmountable.
The concept developed under pre-industrial times, but technology
brought new vehicles and complex management organizations.

Perhaps

the first time the "old" common carrier doctrine was applied to a new
type of "industry" was in the mid-1800’s when shipowners were deemed
to be common carriers.

17

One leading case decided in the United States

Supreme Court expressed:

»

By the settled law, in the absence of some valid agree
ment to the contrary, the owner of a general ship
carrying goods for hire, whether employed in internal,
in coasting, or in foreign commerce, is a common car
rier, with the liability of an insurer against all
losses, except from such irresistible causes as the
act of God and public enemies.

15

Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 95.

^ Arrow Aviation, Inc., v. Moore» 266 F. 2d., 1959, p. 488; see
also: United States v. Smith, 215 F. 2d., 1954, p. 217; Thomas v.
National Delivery Association, 24 F. Supp., (DC Pennsylvania),1937,
p. 173.
^Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 93.
18
Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S., 1888,
p • 436.

9

A similar decision was reached in the Willdomino case:
The Willdomino was a general ship engaged in the common
carriage of merchandise for hire. A carrier of goods
by water like a carrier by land is an insurer, and
though no actual blame is imputable to it, is absolutely
liable, in the absence of a special contract limiting
its liability, for all damages sustained by the goods
intrusted to its care unless the damage is occasioned
by the act of God, the public enemy, the public
authority, the fault of the shipper, or the inherent
nature of the thing shipped.19
Since the Willdomino case, several acts and laws governing water
carriers have been passed.

Since the history of the shipping industry

is not the purpose of this study these will be examined only briefly.
After World War I domestic shipping particularly in the coastal and
intercoastal trading areas, was subject to severe competition, declining
earnings and a need for some type of regulation.

The Shipping Act of

1916 created the U.S. Shipping Board and was granted the authority to
promote and regulate deepwater shipping.

Common carriers had to publish

and file rates, fares and charges with the Board even though it could
not fix minimum or actual rates.

This action set a precedent, as this

study will disclose, as most common carriers are required to file
tariffs with theirregulatory agencies.

In 1933 the Intercoastal

Shipping Act was passed requiring common carriers operating in inter
coastal trade via the Panama Canal to publish their actual rates.

Five

years later an amendment gave the regulatory body authority to set
minimum rates for domestic deepwater common carriers.

20

The United

States Maritime Commission, known today as the Federal Maritime

^^Wilidomino, The, 300 F., (3rd Cir.), 1924, p. 5; cert den. 270
U.S., 1925, p. 647.

20

James Guandolo, Transportation Law (Dubuque, Iowa; 1965), p. 316.

10

Commission, was created through the Merchant Marine Shipping Act of
1936, which transferred to this Commission all the functions, powers
and duties formerly contained in all the previous shipping acts.

21

Water carriers regulated by the FMC were still required to file their
tariffs but a certificate or permit to operate as an ocean carrier was
not needed.
The question of liability was, of course, an important issue.
In 1893 the Harter Act was passed in order to give some uniformity to
the carrier's liability in water carriage.

The main point of the Act

stated that it is the duty of the owner to make the ship seaworthy.

22

The ship owner is also liable for loss or damage of cargo usually based
on a maximum liability of $500 per ton, net or gross, as rated.

jjo

23

u a u i i o x i c o

Common Carrier Regulation for Railways
The roots of common carrier laws are in road carriers and thus it
should come as no surprise that many of the alterations in the doctrine
came about during the development of the railroad industry.

Railway

traffic operated under the principles of the old English common laws
which:

21

Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 157.

22

See Southern Pacific S.S. Co. v. New Orleans Coal & Bisso Towboat
Co.. Inc., 43 F. 2d., (DC Louisiana), 1930, p. 177; Fort Gaines, The,
24 F. 2d., (DC Maryland), 1928, p. 849; Sun Co. v. Healy, 163F., (2nd
Cir.), 1908, p. 48.
Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 159.

11

• • . • demanded little more than that they should carry
for all persons who applied, in the order to which the
goods were delivered at the particular station and that
their charges for transportation be reasonable.24
The first time the term "common carrier" was used in a formal
document, was in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.

The act was

written by a special Senate committee upon the recommendation by
President Grant to make a thorough investigation of Federal railway
regulation.

25

The Interstate Commerce Act prescribed twenty-four

provisions regarding railroad regulation of which six are applicable
to common carriers.

These six provisions have been touched upon

previously, but the wording of the Commerce Act may add clarity.
First of all, a common carrier is one which hauls pas
sengers or goods belonging to others. Second, it
offers its services for hire. Third, it must under
take to serve all who may apply for its services.
Fourth, it must serve without discrimination all
those who are similarly circumstanced. Fifth, it
must offer its services at reasonable rates. And
sixth, it is expected to use more than ordinary care
to assume the safe arrival of passengers and freight
at destination.26
Although the original Commerce Act was specifically designed to regu
late the railway industry, it also applied to foreign and domestic
transportation.

Joseph H. Tedrow, Regulation of Transportation: Practice and
Procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission (Iowa: Wm. C.
Brown Co., 1955), p. 9.
~
25

Emory R. Johnson, Elements of Transportation, A Discussion of
Steam, Railroad, Electric Railway, Ocean and Inland Water Transporta
tion (New York: Kennikat Press, 1970), p. 141.
Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation, p. 94.

12

In its original wording the Interstate Commerce Act contained no
provisions concerning the common carrier's liability for goods beyond
its own lines when receiving them for shipment on their own lines.
Many times the rail carriers would issue bills of lading containing
clauses that relieved them from liability, often even in cases of
negligence.

27

This lack of regulation,particularly the carrier's

liability,resulted in the enactment of two amendments: namely, the
Hepburn Act, 1906 (the Carmack amendment) and the Clayton Act, 1914
(the Cummins amendment).

The Hepburn Act extended the Commerce Com

mission's jurisdiction to include all other facets of railway trans
portation plus pipelines.

A major provision of this 1906 legislation

empowered the ICC to set maximum rates and to enforce its own orders.

28

The Carmack amendment required the originating common carrier to issue
a receipt for a shipment and made the initial carrier responsible to
the holder of the receipt for damages occuring while the goods are in
its custody or the custody of any succeeding carrier.

29

Prior to the

enactment of the Carmack amendment there had been no clear definition
of a carrier's liability} now it was placed on the originating carrier.
However, in 1916 this was amended whereby both the initial and connecting carrier were made liable to the holder of the receipt.

27

30

Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 153.

28
Marvin L. Fair, Ernest W. Williams, Jr., Economics of Trans
portation (New York: Harper <£ Brothers, 1950), p. 469.
29

Interstate

Commerce Commission Reports, Vol. 33, 1915,

p. 682.
30

Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 153.

13

St. Louis Railroad Terminal Case
Prohibits Unreasonable Rates
During the evolution of the common carrier doctrine principles
have emerged as various judicial and legislative agencies have assumed
temporary or permanent authority over each industry.

The primary re

sponsibility of the early common callers was to their trade or craft
which had to be essential to community life.

The concept of respon

sibility and public service slowly emerged and had become fairly well
established by the time the shipping industry became this country's
leading industry.

If the developing railway industry could be credited

with adding one more principle to the common carrier doctrine, that
would be "rate regulation."

Although the idea of charging reasonable

rates did not gain full attention until after the telephone and tele
graph companies fell under the authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, it was conceived during the railroad era.

This concept

was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. St. Louis
Railroad Terminal;
Under the Interstate Commerce Law, and indeed under
the common law of the land, tolls must be reasonable,
and the government has the power to make them so if
they are not . . . . The charge for service in any
case can be stated in one word--cost. No money re
ceived for the service rendered goes to any other
purpose than paying expenses of operation, taxes,
fixed charges and proper maintenance.^

31

U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S.,
1912, p. 385; see also: Texas and Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S., 1906, p. 448.
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Rate regulation was a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, as men
tioned above.

But unreasonable rates and discrimination, undue prefer

ence and combining agreements among railroads continued even after
strict regulations had been set forth in various Supreme Court rulings.
To understand this is to come to grips with the growing complexity of
the common carrier doctrine in corporate America,

If common carriage

means the ability and willingness to be responsible for all traffic needs,
then the rail carriers meet those tests exceptionally well.

32

Not only

can they absorb

traffic that because of bad weather cannot move over

other agencies,

but railways also have proved under general war con

ditions to have

the capacity to expand service with a minimum drain

on war essential resources.

In short, the railroad industry has the

capacity to satisfactorily handle great traffic load.
Excess capacity was large, and provided the avenue to
lower unit costs and rate levels--even to greater prof
itability under discriminatory rates subject to regu
latory approval. By obtaining relatively large revenue
contributions above variable costs from many commodi
ties and hauls, the rails could operate profitably as a
whole, bear the social responsibilities of general com
mon carriers, and even promote general economic develop
ment by carrying other commodities at a loss or with
only slight revenue contributions,33
Rate regulation is considered to be warranted in situations where compe
tition is not adequate to protect against excessive rates, undue return
from a monopoly franchise, discrimination or other abuse of the power.

32

James C, Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public Policy
(Washington, D,C,: Brookings Institute, 1959), p, 18,
33

Ibid,
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Although the privately-owned railroads x^ere subject to regulatory rates,
their profits were substantially high.

The common carrier doctrine pro

posed that carriers' rates should be reasonable so that "anyone" who
wanted access to a carrier's facilities could afford such service.
is the premise on which rate regulation was founded.

This

By the very nature

of its size and diversity of services, the railroads could, as is shown
above, reap substantial profits despite rate regulations.
It was at this point that the common carrier doctrine underwent
changes, and the difficulties of such status became apparent.

In the

St. Louis Railroad Terminal case it was clearly established that the
money received for common carrier service was to go for paying ex
penses of operation, etc.

But the railroads were not only just breaking

even, they were operating in the black.

The dichotomy is obvious; on the

one hand the common carrier was to operate at cost, while by the nature
of its facilities the

railways- became a profitable business.

As a re

sult a further complexity was added to the common carrier doctrine and
as this study will reveal it is a majorpoint of contention in the cable tele
vision industry.

That is, what constitutes a fair rate of return?

This

question has yet to be answered due to not only the complexity of the
common carrier doctrine but to the complexity of the industries to which
it has been applicable.
Bell Telephone Entrepreneurs Promote Economic
Gain as New Common Carrier Philosophy
High profits of common carriers became more acute when Bell patented
the telephone in 1876.

34

Prior to that time Western Union Telegraph

34 Harry M. Trebing, "Common Carrier Regulation--The Silent Crisis,"
Law &. Contemporary Problems, Vol. 34 , 1969 , p. 303.
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Company, chartered in 1851, achieved an early dominance in the field of
telecommunications and became the first nation wide monopoly,

35

A con

frontation seemed evident particularly after Western Union responded to
the challenge of the Bell Company by devising an improved telephone.
But in 1879 an agreement was reached whereby Western Union agreed to
stay out of voice communication and Bell agreed to stay out of the tele
graph field.
Perhaps the most important event of this period occured
when Theodore N, Vail became president of the Bell Tele
phone Company, Vail proceeded to establish a corporate
structure which was ultimately to become the dominant
pattern for industrial organization for the entire
common carrier industry, Vail viewed telecommunications,
and particularly the telephone, as a nationwide, inter- ^
woven system with the Bell Company as the dominant firm,
Vail's belief in a single telecommunications system and his actions to
insure its development could be termed as the primary turning point in
the changing common carrier doctrine.
mented to achieve Vail's objective.
competition.

Two courses of action were imple
The first was the elimination of

Between 1894-95 most of the Bell patents had expired

which opened the door for the independent telephone companies who began
to challenge the Bell system,

"The market structure of the common

carrier industry had changed drastically.

For the first time, direct

competition existed on an intra-industry basis."
challenge by:

37

Bell answered the

a) denying financial resources to the Telephone,

35
J Ibid.
Ibid.
37Ibld., p. 304.
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Telegraph & Cable Co. thereby destroying their effort to.develop a com
petitive long-distance system; b) Bell companies refused to inter
connect with non-Bell companies; and c) Bell pursued an aggressive
program to buy up independent telephone properties.

38

By 1910, the threat of the independents had largely been
overcome, and the stage was set for the universal service
which Vail envisioned as the objective of the American
common carrier system.39
The second course of action was the encouragement of Bell manage
ment to cooperate with the state regulatory commissions.
was somewhat permissive during this period.

Regulation

Federal regulation of

rates and practices of interstate communication carriers was initiated
by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.

40

But by this time Bell*s domination

in the telephone and telegraph fields was extensive.

However, Bell

succumbed to government pressure and agreed to extend interconnection
privileges to independent companies and divested itself of Western
Union.*
It was during this era that the modern philosophy of common car
rier regulation was established and the tools and techniques of control
were developed.
osophy.

Two events contributed to the birth of this new phil

First, the Interstate Commerce Commission continued to exercise

38iMd.
39
J Ibid., 305.
40

Truman C. Bigham, Merrill J. Roberts, Transportation (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1952), p. 227.
Bell System had acquired control of Western Union in 1909 through
a stock acquisition.
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limited regulation of telegraph and telephone companies, until the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934.

Their regulation paralleled ..

that of the railroad industry, though.
Telegraph companies, for example, have been deemed to
occupy the same relation to commerce as carriers of
messages that railroads do as carriers of goods; and
the same reasoning may be equally applied to telephone
companies and other transmission agencies.
Although several modifications were required in the Interstate
Commerce Act to be made applicable to transmission agencies--telephone
and telegraph companies--these apparently were only in wording.

For

example, the filing and posting of rates and charges, then required of
transportation common carriers was modified to state that telegraph
and telephone companies could establish their own rates, but these
rates must be reasonable.

42

The point of this illustration is that

regulation became preoccupied with the general level of earnings or
revenue requirements rather than over matters affecting market structure.
This is perhaps understandable when taking into consideration that the
development of the telegraph and telephone industries overlapped that
of the railroad industry, from a regulatory standpoint.

High profits

of the railways changed the "old" common carrier doctrine while the
concentrated efforts of Theodore Vail altered the market structure;
the two occuring almost simultaneously.

41
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Texas, 105 U.S., 1881,
p. 461.
42

Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation, p. 110.

^Trebing, "Silent Crisis," p. 306.
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What emerged was a philosophy of "natural monopoly" for
common carrier communications in which the promotion of
the public interest was equated with the maintenance of
systematic integrity and the task of Dlanning for
national and regional requirements. 4-3

Physical Nature of Radio Poses Common
Carrier Regulatory Problems
The common carrier doctrine of the 19th and 20th centuries has
changed as the way of doing business has changed.

Its complexity may

stem from the idea that the structure of the market, particularly during
Vail's era, was changing faster than the common carrier doctrine.

But

the tables were about to be turned with the advent of wireless communica
tion.

Broadcast technology was about to transform common carrier commu

nications from a relatively stable industry "to one in which change was
coming at a faster rate than it could be assimilated by existing market
structures and institutions."

44

Many of the principles that were adopted to regulate transportation
and transmission agencies were merely modified to fit broadcasting.

But

the nature of the medium was different and this posed new problems for
Congress.
lated?

Specifically, by whom and how was this new medium to be regu

One unsuccessful answer was a bill introduced before Congress

that would have classified radio broadcasting as a "common carrier." Radio
would then be subjected to federal rate regulation and under the obligation to
serve all those who sought the use of its facilities.

45

^Trebing, "Silent Crisis," p. 306.
^ I b i d ., p. 310.
Dickson Fricks, Jr., "Radio Broadcasting as a Common Carrier,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 19, 1932, p. 174.
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The first real legislative act governing broadcasting was the Wire
less Ship Act of 1910 which empowered the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor to make'regulations applicable to radio.

Radio in this early

stage was utilized as a life saving device at sea.

46

Two years later

the Radio Act of 1912 was passed which made it illegal to operate a radio
station without first securing a license from the Secretary of Commerce* but
this specification was ruled unconstitutional.

The Secretary of Commerce

could only prescribe conditions under which licensees would operate with
penalties for violation.
the Radio Act of 1927.

Chaos ruled the airwaves until the passage of
The government still had not addressed itself

to the issue of common carrier, but the term "wireless" was added to
the Interstate Commerce Act.

The problem was in deciding whether radio

was similar enough to categorize it with the railway system and/or the
telegraph and telephone industry.
The crux of the problem regarding radio being regulated as a common
carrier pointed to the physical nature of the medium:
In telephonic and telegraphic communication, while
nothing visible and tangible is transported, the dif
ficulty of conceiving that as commerce and subject to
the power of Congress is aided by the necessity of
wires and physical property in order to transmit the
ideas and messages. But in radio the problem becomes
more difficult because there is no material connec
tion between the states, not even air waves, merely
the indefinable ether waves permeating everywhere.^7

46

Frank J. Kahn, ed., Documents in American Broadcasting (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 7.
47

Carberry F. O'Shea, "Radio--Federal Jurisdiction & Regulatory
Power Over Radio Communication,11 Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. XVII,
1929, p. 340.

It was well established that the communication of intelligence between
countries or states was the subject of governmental regulation under
the Commerce Clause.

48

Furthermore sending messages across state lines

was considered interstate commerce.

It seemed inevitable that radio

would be included within this framework since its application to communication by telephone and telegraph had already been determined.

49

Scholars debated the issue and two sides formed; those who felt
radio broadcasting should be a common carrier and those who felt it
should not. Advocates of the former position felt that "by taking
control of radio communication Congress has power to fix rates for
individual messages and for broadcasting.

It can provide for censor-

ship, and probably complete supervision of programs."

50

Proponents of

the latter view agreed that there were points of similarity between
radio and the universally established common carrier, a railway;* how
ever, the similarity between the broadcasting station and the railway
company ceases at a certain point.
The railroad, and carriers of a similar nature, can best
serve the public interest by lending their facilities to
all who wish to employ them. Legislation forcing upon
broadcasting stations any such duty, however, would seem
most unwise and undesirable. The first duty of a broad-

48

Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S.,
1878, p. 9.
49
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. William Pendleton, 122 U.S.,
1886, p. 347.
50

O ’Shea, "Federal Jurisdiction and Regulatory Powers," p. 345.

*Both render their service for hire with the consumer or listener
ultimately paying the cost, and as agencies of commerce are public em
ployees and servants.
\
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casting station should be the furnishing of programs
which will serve the interest, convenience, and neces
sity of the listening public, not the broadcaster.51

AT&T Experiments With Common Carrier
Radio Operations
Even though there was no legislative action passed in regards to
the applicability of the common carrier doctrine to radio broadcasting,
common carrier operations, under the name "toll broadcasting," were
conducted for a time in the early 1920's by a New York radio station
owned by American Telephone and Telegraph.

52

AT&T was hesitant about

the new7 radio medium for obvious economic reasons.

Two factions devel

oped between those who wanted the company to venture into radio and
those who saw the company's economic future best fulfilled by dissem
inating entertainment through telephone wires.

Two events seemed to

trigger AT&T's "public radiotelephone broadcasting" as they first termed
it (later to call it "toll broadcasting").

First came the debut of KDKA

which obliterated the concept of sending information/entertainment over
telephone wires.

The second "event" was AT&T's continued hesitancy to

become involved in the radio industry because of its lack of receivers
to sell.

As a result, it seems, the company combined the ideas of both

factions, when on January 12, 1922, it disclosed its concept of "toll
broadcasting":
We, the telephone company, were to provide no programs.
The public was to come in. Anyone who had a message

51
52

Fricks, "Radio Broadcasting as a Common Carrier," p. 175.

Erick Barnouw, A Tower in Babel (New York:
Press, 1966), p. 106.

Oxford University

for the world or wished to entertain was to come in
and pay their money as they would upon coming into a
telephone booth, address the world, and go out.53
Although ’'toll broadcasting" carried with it none of the terms
usually associated with the common carrier doctrine, the basic concept
of "holding oneself out for hire" was present.

Furthermore, AT&T en

visioned a network of thirty-eight stations that would operate on a
"toll" basis.

The plan was made public and contained tones of common

carrier concept:
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company will provide
no program of its own, but provide the channels through
which anyone with whom it makes a contract can send out
their own programs.^
The dream became a reality on July 25, 1922 as WBAY, the first radio
telephone toll station, broadcast its first program.

55

Unfortunately,

the tall buildings in New York Citj' were absorbing the station’s
signal and as a result, the station could barely be heard.

Not all

was lost as a transmitter placed in a different part of the city was
able to broadcast a strong signal.

This transmitter was given the

call letters WEAF and became the pioneer toll broadcasting station.
AT&T had claimed there were many requests for its public broadcast
service, but in spite of these it was over a month before toll broad
casting found a single customer!

An economic battle was being waged

53Ibid.
54
William P. Banning, Commercial Broadcasting Pioneer: The WEAF
Experiment 1922-26 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p7""68.
55

Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, p. 108.
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during WE A F ’s debut between those who thought the only way to support
radio broadcasting was by advertising and by others who viewed any form of
commercialism as distasteful.

Due to the lack of interest in AT&T’s

"toll broadcasting" and their need for revenues to support their pro
gramming, * radio broadcasting as a common carrier was short-lived.

The FCC Does Not Recognize Radio
to be a Common Carrier
It was not until

thepassage of the Communications

Act of 1934 that

the newly-established Federal Communications Commission addressed it
self to the issue of common carrier as it applied to radio broadcasting.
They stated in that document:
Any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy, except where reference is made to common car
riers not subject to this Act; but a person engaged in
radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person
is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.56
The reasoning behind the FCC's ruling not to consider radio broadcasting
as a common carrier was that due to the physical limitations of the radio
spectrum, not every person or group could make use of its facilities.
One of the tenets of

thecommon carrier

doctrine is that a

undertake to serve all who apply for its services.

In

carriermust

the case of radio

this would be physically impossible.

*AT&T had at first been determined not to produce programs.
It
wanted no more responsibility over content than it had in the case of
phone calls. (Barnouw, p. 109). Lack of control over content has,
since the development of CATV, become a basic principle of the common
carrier doctrine.
Title I, Section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended.
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From a regulatory standpoint the advent of television in the late
1940's and early 1950's posed no new problems concerning the common
carrier doctrine.

The channel scarcity argument was directly applicable

to television and hence it too was deemed not to be a common carrier
when the Communications Act of 1934 was amended to include television
broadcasting.
Broadcasting altered the common carrier doctrine by raising the
channel scarcity issue.

It had been a main point of the common carrier

doctrine that a carrier should serve all those who undertake its ser
vices,

But the question had not been raised, what happens if there is

a limited supply?

Road and water carriers handled excess demand by

increasing their load capacity.

The telephone companies developed

larger trunk lines to prevent circuit overloads.

But the electro

magnetic spectrum is limited; only a certain number of channels are
available.

Prior to this time the common carrier doctrine had under

gone changes of an economic nature (liability, rate regulation);
broadcasting brought changes in the doctrine of a physical or techno
logical nature.

As the following chapters will reveal, cable television

poses further questions regarding liability, rate regulation and
technology.

CHAPTER II

CABLE TECHNOLOGY

Broadcast technology restricts a television station to only one
channel, but broadband technology allows a cable company to have a
still undetermined maximum number of channels.

Few existing systems

actually operate more than 12 channels but forty or fifty channel
systems are technologically feasible.^

Cable television makes it

possible to shift communications from an economy of ’'scarcity" to
one of abundance.

The advocates of public access to CATV point to the

unlimited availability of cable channels.

But from a technological

standpoint there are some problems inherent in multi-channel cable
systems.

Some of these problems may be such that only expensive

electronic equipment (much of it not yet developed) can correct the
situation.

Cable service is usually purchased to improve reception,

but television picture quality is limited intrinsically by the channel
bandwidth and by the poor reception

characteristics of most television

sets.^

^Michael Botein, "Access to Cable Television,"
Vol. 57, 1972, p. 424.

Cornell Law Review,

^Walter S. Baer, Cable Television; A Handbook for Decision
making (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1133-NSF), p. 38.
26
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The Physical Limitations of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
The single most significant characteristic of over-the-air tele
vision broadcasting is that it makes use of the electromagnetic or
radio spectrum. (See Table IE)

Electromagnetic waves, produced by the

acceleration or oscillation of an electric charge, radiate outwards
from the source at the speed of light, 300 million meters per second.
These waves have a frequency, expressed in cycles per second (or
Hertz), and a wavelength, generally expressed in units of the metric
system.

3

The following diagram will illustrate this:

4

Time

"A" complete cycle and includes a movement from "0"
to "B", back past "0" to "A" and back again to "0."
Frequency depicts numbers of cycles of movement com
pleted in a specific time period.
Wavelength is illustrated by "D."

3
Jones,

Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,’

P *. 7.
^Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America (New York:
Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 27.

Houghton
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The electromagnetic spectrum can be made analogous to a super
highway, over which the produce of communication is carried to and from
a market.

AM radio, television broadcasting, mobile radio, microwave

and even visible light, are electromagnetic waves that can exist simul
taneously and distinctively in the space around us.

The distinction is

that they occupy different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Each signal rides on a different lane of the highway, identified by its
frequency (the number of oscillations per second of its carrier wave).

5

The radiation of waves through space is referred to as propagation.
Physical laws govern the characteristics of propagation.
ogy could be illustrated by dropping a pebble into a lake.

A simple anal
The waves

radiate from the source equally in all directions, forming a cir
cular pattern.

As the waves become distributed over a larger and

larger area of water, the ripples become smaller and smaller.

A

similar effect occurs with radio energy, which radiates from a trans
mitter into space equally in all directions, also forming a circular
pattern.

As the energy becomes widely distributed, it in turn becomes

thinly dispersed.

That is, after a certain distance, the signal becomes

so weak it is undistinguishable.

This effect is known as "attenuation"

and as this study will reveal is a serious problem in cable communi
cations.^

Other physical properties affect radio energy such as

5
Hubert J. Schlafly, "The Real World of Technological Evolution in
Broadband Communications," (A Report prepared for the Sloan Commission),
1972, p. 2.
Head, Broadcasting in America, p. 35.
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atmospheric conditions, physical obstacles (such as tall buildings) or
ionized areas.

Also if two signals occupy the same frequency at the

same geographical location there will be "interference" between these
two signals.

These restrictions limit the number of frequencies that

can be assigned to a particular service in a particular location.

The

chief problem of spectrum allocation is using each frequency range to
its best advantage by capitalizing on its strong points and avoiding
degradation of service because of its weak points.^
There is a means, however, of using the same frequency
simultaneously in the same location. Do not allow the
signal to radiate. Keep it confined so that it reaches
the receiver terminals over a shielded and a controlled
path. Protect the signal from interference with or by
radiated signals which saturate the air.*^

Coaxial Cable Provides Unlimited Signal Carrying Capacity
The use of physical wires affords the opportunity of protecting a
broadcast signal.

The "magic" of cable technology is the coaxial

cable, a wire suitable to high frequency transmissions.

Such cables

are used to transmit electrical signals from zero frequency (direct
current) all the way up to several thousand million cycles per second.
The tremendous signal carrying capacity of the co
axial cable was vividly portrayed by FCC Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson when he stated that comparing the
cable to the telephone wire was like comparing
"Niagara Falls to a garden hose."^

7

Ibid., p. 38.

g
Schlafly, "Broadband Communication," p. 2.
9
Robert L. Steiner, Visions of Cable-Vision (A Report of the
Stephen H. Wilder Foundation), 1972, p. 197

The coaxial cable is a wire with a small diameter inner conductor
positioned at the center of a larger diameter outer conductor.

Most

cables have a tough outer jacket of polyethylene for environmental
protection.

The four sizes of coaxial cable generally used are 3/4-

inch, 1/2-inch,'27/64-inch and approximately 1/4-inch diameter.
The following picture will illustrate this:

^Copper sheath (outer
conductor)
Plastic form sealant
Copper wire (inner
conductor)
Plastic jacket

Headend Processes Television Signals for Distribution
Over Trunk Lines to CATV Subscribers
A conventional cable system distributes signals from a headend to
many subscribers.

The illustration in Table HI will illustrate this.

The major components of a cable system are the antennas and headend
facilities, the cable distribution system and the subscriber equipment.
A cable system places its receiving antennas on the highest usable
ground whereby it picks up signals directly off-the-air from television
stations from a maximum distance of 100 miles.

Those at a greater dis

tance are received through a network of microwave links.

^Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 11.

Microwave
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links can be repeated if necessary depending on the terrain and the
distance.

The final receiver, at a cable headend, must demodulate the

video and sound and then modulate these program signals in the form
suitable for a conventional home television receiver.

It is at this

point that most of the degradation of cable signals occur due to the
repeated modulation/demodulation processes.

Such problems will con-

tinue until better techniques or equipments are engineered.

11

A separate antenna is generally used for each broadcast station,
so it can be tuned to the station's frequency and mechanically aligned
to receive the strongest and clearest signal.

Coaxial cables deliver

these signals to the headend, usually located in a small building near
the antenna site.

The headend processes the television signals for

distribution on the cable system.

This process includes:

12

a)

amplifying each signal to sufficient strength for dis
tribution.

b)

filtering out unwanted signals.

c)

"translating” or changing the frequency of some channels
so they can be sent over the cable.

d)

"demodulating" or extracting the TV information from
signals imported by microwave to the community.

e)

"modulating” these imported signals and any video sig
nals that originate with the cable system; that is,
providing them with a carrier frequency to match a stan
dard VHF channel. This must be done for all local
cablecasting, access programming, automated services
and any other locally generated signals.

f)

mixing all the signals into one composite signal for
distribution over the cable.

11Ibid., p. 7.
12

Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking, p. 15.

Attenuation and Amplifier Limitations Pose
Serious CATV Reception Problems
Television signals lose strength, similar to radio energy, as they
travel through the cable, an effect known as "line loss" (attenuation).
All electrical signals suffer some line loss.
higher frequencies.

This loss is greater for

For instance, a 300 MHz signal will undergo the

same percentage of loss in a 200-foot cable that a 50 MHz signal under
goes in 500 feet.

The 50 MHz signal can proceed through 2.5 times as

much cable length as the 300 MHz signal before requiring amplification.
Line loss in a system at Channel 13 is more than double the loss at
Channel 2.

Attenuation also increases with rising temperatures.

Seasonal changes generally require manual system rebalancing by an
operators maintenance crew, even though special compensating circuits
have been installed.

Several devices are used to decrease attenuation.

For instance, larger cables have less line loss. • Consequently, 1/2inch or 3/4-inch cables are used for trunk lines, the backbone of the
distribution system.

Trunk lines, strung on utility poles or in

underground ducts, distribute television signals from the headend
throughout the geographic area served.
could occur but another compensating

14

A great deal of line loss

device is used-ramplifiers.

Particular care goes into designing trunk amplifiers because the
delivered picture quality depends heavily on them, perhaps more than

13
14

Steiner, Visions of Cable-Vision, p. 20.

Carl Pilnick, Cable Television: Technical Considerations in
Franchising Major Market Systems (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1137-NSF),
April 1973, p. 23.
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any other single component.

15

The problem of limiting attenuation is

critically important especially in light of CATV’s proposed multi
channel capacities.

These amplifiers, installed along the trunk line,

serve to boost the signal strength back

to usable

levels.

Using

larger-diameter cables reduces attenuation losses, so that amplifiers
can be spaced farther apart.

The cable cost increases, therefore,

while the amplifier cost per mile decreases.

Conversely, a smaller

cable means lower cable cost but higher amplifier cost.

16

The primary importance of amplifiers, though, is that CATV's
systems' channel capacity is principally set by cable amplifiers.
channel capacity is technically limited!

17

This

This becomes critically

important in light of cable's proposed multi-channel capacities.

The

advocates of common carrier access base many of their arguments on the
abundant availability of cable television channels.

Current amplifiers

are limited to a usable bandwidth of about 300 MHz.

While this theo

retically is equivalent to 50 television channels, interference among
channels gives a practical limit of about 25 to 35 channels for each
cable.

18

The 25 to 35 channel range represents an upper limit.
Engineers find it hard to agree on a precise channel limit,
since it depends on the signal quality one is willing to
accept, the particular amplifier and cable system design?

15
1 Ibid.
Ibid.
^Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking, p. 19.
18 , .
Ibid.
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and environmental factors such as the temperature changes
the amplifier is subject to. ^-9
Interference is a major disadvantage of cable amplifiers.

This is

due to the cascading effect of noise and distortion produced by a string
of amplifiers.

The following diagram will clarify this:

20

^ I b i d ., ftnt. 2.
20

Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 24.
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The portion of noise to signal increases with each amplifier in a given
"string."

The desired signal starts through the cable with a magnitude

of X, which reduces to Y at some point down the line because of attenu
ation.

The first amplifier .boosts the signal back up to X again and

the process is repeated with each successive amplifier.

The same thing

happens with noise content that starts at level A and falls to B.

At

each amplifier location, however, the amplifier not only brings the
noise level back up again, but also generates additional noise and adds
it to the previous level.

Thus, the noise at A-l is a higher percentage

of the signal level X than it was at A.
results in a noise level that
in the form of "snow."

This cumulative process finally

can visibly degrade the picture, usually

Thus, the number of trunk amplifiers that can be

cascaded in one continuous cable run is limited.
The specific limit on the number of amplifiers that
can be cascaded will depend on amplifier character
istics, cable size, expected temperature variations
and other factors. Typical limits, however, range
from 20 to 30 cascaded amplifiers with spacing between
amplifiers of 1500 to 3000 feet. This means there is
a practical limit to the length of a single trunk cable,
which can range perhaps from 5 to 10 miles for conven
tional trunk cable.21.

Broadcast Equipment Now Available May Not
Alleviate CATV Reception Problems
Most of the undesired effects that occur in a cable system can be
attributed to the limitations and noise distortions of amplifiers.
other cable hardware can cause poor picture quality.

These include:

a) bridging amplifiers, which isolate trunk line from subscribers

Ibid., p. 23.

But
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connections; b) feeder cable, cable used to distribute signals from the
trunk line to the point where each subscriber’s individual drop-line
connection is tapped-off; c) taps, connecting wires used to couple drop
cables and feeder cables;and d) drop cable, small length of cable used
to bring the TV signal directly into subscribers' homes.

22

The main

disadvantage of this line equipment is that manufacturers did not intend
the effective range of operation of these devices to go beyond the
limits of their intended use.

23

Many of these devices installed to

date have poor performance records.

In light of the minimum channel

capacity requirements set forth in the February, 1972, Cable Television
Report and Order, many of these items will have to be replaced when
CATV operators expand and up-grade their service.

Although the cost of

these items is modest the quantity is large and the installation labor
input is substantial.

Contrary to FCG intentions,

24

this may pose an

economic burden to some systems.
The design problem for today's CATV system is complex, confusing
and subject to circumstances beyond the control of many cable operators.
Good broadcast reception of a large number of channels
requires skill and luck.
Even with the best equipment,
tower location and propagation paths, so-called studio
quality is an impossible dream. There are many vari
ables over which the cable operator has no control-the program content; the technical excellence of the
program source (AT&T long lines, film, tape or the
broadcast studio camera); the performance of the trans
mitter; the transmitter power; the propagation
distance; weather; and some multi-patch situations.

22Ibid., p. 25.
23

Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 15.

24
Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, p. 3269.
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Surprisingly often the cable operator receives the
blame for those factors.^
Headend processing equipment and selection performance and maintenance
is the total responsibility of the CATV operator.

Yet these functions

are directed by what is available on the market, how well equipment
meets its performance specifications and perhaps, most important, the
economics of the CATV system.
These problems will not be alleviated when cable systems expand to
meet the 1972 FCC requirements.

The number of channels being carried

in a broad-band system is a determining factor in the magnitude of dis
tortion.

New amplifier designs are being tested but many are too costly

to market.

"The fact that so little demonstratable results can be shown

is due more to the inherently slow and painful way in which professionals
make progress in controversial and strange technical areas."

26

On-Channel Interference Limits Channel
Capacity in Major Markets
Before examining the different methods that have been proposed for
cable systems offering a capacity of more than twelve channels, one problem
should be noted that afflicts cable systems with both less and more than
12 channels.
The 12 channel VHF dial has become the standard channel-selection
device for all cable system transmissions compatible with broadcast TV

25

Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 21.

26Ibid., p. 24.
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standards.*

In the early days of cable, systems were usually built in

rural areas and the cable operator transmitted the television signal to
each subscriber on the same channel (carrier frequency) as it was broad
cast.

For example, if the cable company picked up Channel 5 off-the-

air, it was delivered as Channel 5.

But as cable expanded into more

densely populated metropolitan areas, the radiated signal strength from
local television stations was strong.

Suppose a cable system picks up

Channel 5 off-the-air and delivers it to each subscriber, now, however,
each subscriber's receiver can also pick up some of Channel 5's signal
from the radiated broadcast.

The subscriber's receiver is carrying two

television signals, one delivered through the cable and one pick-up offthe-air.

Unfortunately, these arrive at slightly different times since

the propagation velocity through the coaxial cable is less than in air.**
As a result, the signal delay causes a "ghost image" which can be very
?7
distracting*
This effect is particularly acute in New York City due
to the tall skyscrapers.

"Ghosting" becomes particularly troublesome to

the subscriber in the case of color television.

28

Better methods of

*

Television receivers since 1964 also include UHF tuners for Chan
nels 14 to 84. But UHF frequencies (470 to 890 MHz) are too high for
present U.S. cable systems to carry directly.
This is true even with the receiver antenna disconnected, since
a few inches of unshielded wire will pick up the signal in sufficient
strength to allow it to proceed through the receiver.
27

Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 12.

28
Jones,
p. 172.

Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
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shielding the TV receiver could reduce some of this off-the-air pickup,
but it does not represent an effective solution since it would add a
new element of cost to receivers.

This plan has been rejected by set

manufacturers.
The magnitude of the problem becomes critical for the
major market.areas.
In Los Angeles, for example,
there are seven assigned VHF stations: Channels 2, 4, 5,
7 , 9 , 11 and 13. A cable system in the Los Angeles
region might well encounter on-channel interference
for all seven, which would mean, in effect, that they
could not be cabled directly to subscribers at their
broadcast frequencies. The FCC requires, however,
that all local TV broadcasts be provided to cable
subscribers.29
A common solution to this problem has been to translate the carrier fre
quency of each channel that is subject to direct interference to a fre
quency unused in that local area.

For instance, local Channel 3 would

be translated to Channel 4 because if Channel 3 were an assigned channel
in the local area, Channel 4 would not be.

Although this solution works

in some cases, it is impossible in large cities such as Los Angeles,
since the channel of the strong signal is left unoccupied on the cable.
If this were done for all seven channels in Los Angeles there would only be
five unused positions left on the television tuner dial.

30

Thus, CATV sys

tems that do not utilize converters at the subscriber’s location are
limited to less than the available
interference problem.

twelve channels by the direct pickup

In large metropolitan areas, a 12-channel system

can easily reduce itself to a .5-7 channel system.

Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 13.
Ibid.

Three Proposals to Increase CATV Systems
to 24"Channel Capacity
The critical point of this technical discussion is that this situ
ation would be even further aggravated by the FCC’s requirement for
CATV’s expansion to include cablecasting, government, education and
access channels which could not directly use the seven positions where
strong off-the-air pickup existed.

It should be obvious, then, that a

cable operator in the top 100 markets in order to comply with the FCC's
20-channel minimum must design a new cable system. . There are three
principal choices:
1.

Multiple (or Dual Cable Systems: an existing 12channel system could be-enlarged to a 24-channel
system by installing a completely duplicate plant
which carries the same 12 channels but with dif
ferent program material. The only requirement in
addition to present equipment would be a cable
selector switch at the subscriber's set so that
he could choose channels on cable A or cable B. 31-

Simplicity is the principal advantage to this approach.

It eliminates

converters and other problem electronic components, and thus makes the
system more reliable.
transmission.

It also offers attractive advantages for two-way

A disadvantage is cost.

Dual cable systems are obviously

more expensive than single cable systems--not twice as much, since the
added installation costs are small, but about 50 percent more.
disadvantage

A serious

is that a dual system does not eliminate the problem of on-

channel interference.

For example, a community with four strongover-

the air broadcast stations will only have sixteen usable channels which
does not satisfy the FCC requirements.

Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 26.
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2,

Converters: a converter changes a nonstandard
frequency channel to a VHF channel that can be
tuned directly on the subscriber's TV set. In
short, the converter replaces the standard TV
set tuner and provides more channel positions.
The extra channels in a converter system are
carried on the cable at frequencies between
Channel 6 and Channel 7 (known as the mid-band)
and above Channel 13 (known as the super-band).
See Table 1. The industry today designates nine
mid-band channels and thirteen super-baiid chan
nels below 300 MHz. The converter changes the
frequency of a selected channel to a standard
VHF channel frequency that is unused for broad
casting in the community. The TV set tuner is
set permanently to that channel, and all selec
tion is performed at the converter. The conver
ter thus completely eliminates on-channel
interference, since its output will never be at
the same frequency as a strong local station.32

The main advantage of this system, of course, is the elimination of onchannel interference.

But, converters introduce other interference and

picture-degradation difficulties.

Many converters respond inadequately

to variations in signal strength and are overloaded by strong input sig
nals.

This causes picture distortion.

The converter oscillator, a com

ponent necessary for frequency conversion, can drift with temperature
and time.

Channel selectivity--the ability to distinguish sharply

between adjacent channels--is sometimes poor.

And because more frequen

cies are carried on the cable, more interference problems among channels
arise.

These problems are due more to an emphasis on low cost in con

verter design than to technical limitations.

Converters range in price

from $35 to $50 in small quantities to $25 to $30 in lots of 1000.

Since

a converter is needed for each TV set, a $25 unit cost may represent 15
to 20 percent of total System capital investment.

32

Ibid.

Consequently, the

43
pressures for low-cost converter design are great.

Initial cost savings

may be outweighed in a few years by added service calls and subscribers'
complaints.

Another disadvantage might be the limitations of mid-band

and super-band channels.

There is doubt whether all channels can be

used due to unfavorable beat and harmonic combinations.
3.

33

Switched Systems: all of the several varieties of
switched systems bring signals from the headend to
a switching center that serves from twenty to several
hundred subscribers. Two separate wires or cables run
from the switching center to each subscriber receiver.
One wire carries subscriber requests to the switching
center, and the other returns the selected television
signal.34

Switched systems are simple in concept and may have advantages for cer
tain applications, but they demand complex wiring and numerous switching
centers.

In crowded urban areas, the cost of switching centers may be

high and the cost of laying the necessary wiring underground may be pro
hibitive.
There is not a "best solution" to the channel expansion problem.
Systems with multiple cables eliminate converters, but do not prevent
direct interference.

Converters solve the direct interference problem

completely, but introduce new possibilities for interference and picture
degradation.

Switched systems eliminate both the direct interference

and the converter problems, but seem too cumbersome and expensive for
major market operations.
The intent of this chapter has not been to unveil all the problems
of cable television hardware but rather to point out the areas of
oo
This section relies heavily on Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking,
pp. 19-24.
Q /

Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 26.

technological uncertainty and the risks involved in future system expan
sion.

Technological concerns become critically important in common

carrier operations as the availability of multiple channels is the basis
for common carrier access.
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CHAPTER III

CATV:

REGULATORY DILEMMA

In four decades of regulating single-channel broadcasting, the
Federal Communications Commission has adopted a number of methods to
encourage program diversity.

For instance, a potential licensee has

to prove it ■will provide better service than any competing applicant;
comparative hearings are required to consider petitions opposing re
newal of a station's license; the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine"
requires that broadcasters give reply time for controversial issues;
the "duopoly rule" limits the number of broadcasting stations one
individual or corporation may own and finally, the "Blue Book" sets
forth general program guidelines.

But spectrum space in the very-

high-frequency (VHF) band is sufficient to provide only a few tele
vision channels— typically two to four--in most major cities.

This

posed a constraint in view of the FCC's policy of promoting program
diversity.
The Commission became strongly persuaded in the
early 1950's that the development of broadcasting
in the ultra-high-frequency (UHF) portion of the
frequency band, in addition to VHF, was the most
promising approach to relieving the problem. Al
though the number of channels in major markets
using both VHF and UHF would remain restricted,
typically ranging from five to seven, this would
still be a significant improvement over broadcasting
without UHF.1

Leland L. Johnson, Cable Television and the Question of Protecting
Local Broadcasting (Rand Corp. Memo. R-595-MF), October, 1970, p. 1,
47

48

However, the growth of UHF has been slower and less profitable than had
been hoped,

VKF and UHF have significantly different technical and

economic characteristics*

The technical differences are less signifi

cant than the economic differences, but, even from a technical view
point, UHF channel assignments are less advantageous than VHF channel
assignments, because more power and antenna height are required for
UHFs to obtain the same area coverage as VHFs*

UHF signals are also

more vulnerable to obstacles such as rough terrain*

2

But the root of

the problem goes back to the beginning of television operations*

VHF

channels were the first ones licensed and they tended to dominate the
major markets.
• * * • most of the popular programming was on Channels
2 through 13, there was little consumer interest in
television receivers capable of receiving UHF channels.
In the absence of such receivers, UHF broadcasters were
unable to interest advertisers in their programming; and
as a consequence, they lacked the financial means to
underwrite popular mass audience programming.3
This is the atmosphere in which cable television emerged.

The po

tential of cable for bringing many additional channels into metropolitan
areas, and the potential conflicts with over-the-air broadcasting, was
hardly perceived.

At that time, most observers had never heard of cable

television, much less had perceived its long-term potential.

4

Although

the FCC*s attempts at activating the UHF channels came during CATV's in
fancy, the consequences of its decision had a powerful effect on the
regulatory development of cable television.

This effect resulted in

2

Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,

p. 12.
3Ibid.. p. 13.
4
Johnson, Protecting Local Broadcasting, p. 1.

49
restrictive policies that were to govern the industry for nearly ten
years.
The slow and halting progress toward achievement of
the goals set for UHF and the potential of CATV as
an additional rather than an auxiliary broadcast
service have left the FCC with a national communi
cation policy that seems at odds with economic and
technical reality.^
»
The Commission's insistence that CATV cannot be allowed to destroy UHF
\.

and its further insistence that local broadcasters be protected have been
£
major reasons for the FCC's restrictive policies.
This attitude
apparently has had some bearing on the Commission's failure to "act
on the very important issue of common carrier access to CATV--a problem
which the Commission consistently delights in raising and then never
resolving."

The multi-channel capacity inherent in common carrier

access might, due to audience fragmentation, pose an economic hardship
for local broadcasters.
'V
FCC Rejects Legal Application of Common Carrier Doctrine
to CATV in Frontier Case
In light of this illustration it is interesting to note that the
FCC's first formal assessment of cable television dealt with the economic
impact of such systems on local broadcasters.

It is rather coincidental,

too, that this assessment dealt with the common carrier issue.

On

5
Charles 0. Verrill, Jr., "CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or
Common Carrier?" Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 34, 1969, p. 590.
^Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C. 2d.,
1965, p. 469.
7

Michael Botein, "CATV Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions,"
New York University Law Review, Voli 45, 1970, p. 839.

50
April 2, 1958, the Commission denied a petition by a group of television
and radio broadcasters that it assert jurisdiction over CATV as a common
carrier.

8

Frontier Broadcasting Co. claimed that CATV systems were com

mon carriers and requested the Commission to authorize CATV systems as
communication common carriers and "to establish a basis upon which
reasonable charges, practices, classifications and regulations can be
9
determined."
Frontier Broadcasting Co. contended that CATV systems
were engaged

in "wire communication" within the meaning of Section 3 (a)

of the Communications Act* and:
• .. that they will serve any member of the public
who undertakes to pay the applicable charges and to
whom the service can feasibly be provided; that the
systems' undertaking is to transmit signals originating
with broadcast stations to the system's subscriber
and that the operations of the systems are in inter
state commerce. They conclude, therefore, that CATV
systems are common carriers engaged in interstate
commerce thus subject to provisions of the Communi
cations Act relating to common carriers.10
The defendant,

Laramie Community TV Co., denied it was a common

carrier because they merely engaged in providing a physical facility,
such as many apartment houses and motels provide, whereby people may
obtain clearer television reception.

Their main argument stated that

they were not a common carrier in the ordinary sense because the

8

Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C., 1958, p. 251.

9

Ibid.
"k
Wire communication defined as transmission of writing, signs, sig
nals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between points of origin and reception of such trans
mission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and
services incidental to such transmission.
10Ibid., p. 252.
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customer has no voice in what programs/information is to be received
other than his option to turn off the s e t . ^

Upon consideration of

the arguments presented the Commission handed down a landmark decision
saying in parts
Even though the operation of a CATV system may have
several attributes in common with the operation of a
communications common carrier, particularly to the
extent that there is an offer to transmit by wire,
intelligence in the form of television broadcast
signals to any member of the public who desires to
subscribe to the service, there appears to be at
least one significant difference.
This difference
lies in the fact that the specific signals received
and distributed by the CATV system are, of necessity,
determined by the CATV system and not the subscriber.
No individual subscriber has the option nor may he
compel the CATV system to receive and deliver a par
ticular signal at a given time; nor has he the option
or right to compel the station to receive and deliver
signals different from, or in addition to, those
offered or selected by the CATV system . . . . These
considerations appear to militate against a conclusion
that CATV systems are engaged in a common carrier
u n d e r t a k i n g . 12

The

Frontier case did little to alter the common carrier doctrine per

se

yet it served as a kind of stumbling block, making the Commission quite
chary about the common carrier subject.

So much, in fact, it was not until

nearly a decade later that any action was taken to

resolve the

issue.

The Frontier decision has been reaffirmed in two subsequent

cases.

13
In Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co., v. FCC,
the court

held

that

the

position taken by the FCC that regulating CATV as

adjuncts of the nation's broadcasting system was a "more appropriate

11Ibid., p. 253.
12Ibid.,
1 D I G • 9 p.
p« 254.
4•
^ Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.E., 359 F. 2d.,
(D.C. Cir), 1966, p. 282.
—
-

avenue for Commission action than wide range of regulation implicit in
common carrier t r e a t m e n t . I n United States, v. Southwestern Cable
15
Co.,
a case whose scope had far-reaching effects in the industry, the
court said that although the FCC found that CATV was related to inter
state transmission cable systems were neither common carriers nor
broadcasters.

Therefore, CATV did not apply to any of the principal

regulatory categories created by the Communications Act.

FCC Refuses to Assume Jurisdiction Over CATV
In 1959 Notice of Inquiry
The history of FCC regulation of cable television is complex and
confusing.

During the time the Frontier case was being heard, the FCC

requested authority from Congress to regulate CATV but no legislation
was enacted.

After its initial refusal to assert jurisdiction, the FCC,

in obvious response to CATV's threat to over-the-air broadcasting, has
come full circle.

This study does not intend to examine the entire

regulatory history of the Commission, rather only those rulings applica
ble to the common carrier concept.
Shortly after the Frontier case the FCC issued A Notice of Inquiry^where it posed various questions concerning its power to regulate CATV
systems.

The Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction over

14Ibid.. p. 284.
15

United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S., 1968, p. 157;
also U.S. Law Week, Vol. 36, 1968, p. 4553.
1626 F.C.C., 1959, pp. 403-417.

cable television as a common carrier and cited its decision in Frontier
Broadcasting C o .

It also dismissed the assertion that jurisdiction

could be assumed under the power to control broadcasters, since CATV
transmission to customers was entirely by wire, any radio links being
only between the "head end" of the cable and the master antenna and
never to subscribers.^

A major point of the Inquiry stated that a

CATV system's use of common carrier microwave for long-range transmis
sion of its signals was no basis for jurisdiction.

A case being heard

near the time the Inquiry was released also denied that the Commission
had "plenary power

to regulate any and all enterprises which happen

to be connected with one of the many aspects of coiranunica tions."

18

FCC Attempts to Regulate Cable Television
Through Microwave Common Carriers
Shortly after the Inquiry the FCC handed down a decision that
modified its position.

It issued a "procedural rule"

19

under which it

could regulate those common carriers that had been licensed to serve
CATV and that had been created for that purpose.

By requiring those

carriers desiring to expand to show that in the preceding licensing
period at least

50

percent of their total service hours and

50

percent of the channels over which they operated were used by customers
not directly controlling or controlled by the applicant, the Commission

^^Ibid.,. p. 405.
18
CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C., (Docket 12443), 1959,
p. 429.
1947 C.F.R. Sec. 21.709 (1965); see also 1 F.C.C. 2d., 1965,
p. 902.
,

54
was ostensibly attempting to guarantee that only a common carrier ful
filling a public need would utilize a frequency reserved to the public.
It was not until the Carter Mountain case that the Commission completely
reversed its decision.
20
In Carter Mountain,
the FCC denied a license for the construction
of a microwave transmission and relay network serving several CATV sys
tems in Wyoming on the grounds that the proposed use of the facility
would substantially impair the economic situation of a local television
station.

Carter Mountain represents the assumption by the FCC of control

over CATV systems making use of common carrier microwave transmissions.
The practical effect of the "procedural rule" and Carter Mountain was a
move by the FCC to gain control over cable television through the common carriers.

21

The Carter Mountain decision would, in time, provide

the jurisdictional foundation for the First Report and Order of 1965.

FCC Issues 1965 Notice Followed by 1966 Second Report
and Order Granting FCC Official Authority
to Regulate CATV
On April 23, 1965, the FCC issued two documents simultaneously, its
First Report and Order

22

and a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed

20

Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C., 1962, pp. 459-468;
see also Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F. 2d., (D.C.
Cir.), 1963', pp. 353-369.
~
^
, "The Wire Mire:
Vol. 79, 1965, p. 370.
22

The FCC and CATV," Harvard Law Review,

In the matter of Amendment to Subpart I, Part 21, to Adopt Rules
and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Domestic
Point to Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Radio Stations
Used to Relay Television Signals to CATV; First Report and Order, 38
F.C.C., 1965, pp. 683-690.

23
Rule Making. The First Report and Order was basically a general appli
cation of restrictions for all microwave-served CATV systems,,

It was

the Notice of Inquiry and not the First Report and Order that was impor
tant, as the Notice asserted FCC jurisdiction over cable television but
asked what form and to what degree this jurisdiction should be establish
Secondly, the Notice imposed a freeze (that was nob lifted until the
1972 Cable Television Report and Order) upon major market penetration
while information could be gathered to determine the best way to regu
late CATV.
Response to the Commission's invitation in the Notice of Inquiry,
for CATV operators and interested parties to file suggestions and
24
comments set the stage for the 1966 Second Report and Order.

For

all practical purposes the Second Report and Order signified the FCC's
official authority to regulate community antenna television.*

Several

restrictions were placed on the cable industry, two of which have direct
bearing on this study:
23

In the matter of Amendment of Part 24, 74 (Proposed Subpart J and
9) to Adopt Rules Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast
Signals by CATV, and Related Matters; Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C. 2d., 1965, pp. 453-467
24
Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations
to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systemd (Second Report and Order), 2 F.C.C. 2d., 1966, pp. 725-801; see
also: Edward Greenberg, 'Wire Television and the FCC's Second Report
and Order on CATV Systems," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. - 10, 1967,
pp. 181-203.
*

CATV was to be regulated not because it was a common carrier, or
because it rebroadcasts television services, or because it is a broad
cast service, but rather because, in the FCC's judgment, it posed a
threat--if unregulated--to "free television." (Verrill, "Cablecaster or
Common Carrier," p. 593.)

56

1.

Compulsory carriage:

a CATV system must carry the signals

of local stations.
2.

Major-market/distant-station policy:

under this rule a CATV

system may not import into the 100 largest TV markets (em
bracing metropolitan areas containing over 80 percent of the
nation's population) unless it is given permission by the
Commission, following a hearing which would determine whether
CATV operations in a particular area "would be consistent with
the public interest, and particularly the establishment and
healthy maintenance of UHF television broadcast service."

25

These two restrictions coupled with the Frontier decision alter the
rationale that CATV is not a common carrier.

In the Frontier case the

FCC found a distinction between CATV and the traditional common carrier
services in that the CATV operator had the final choice in selecting the
signals to be carried over the system.
from the existing signals.

The subscriber could only choose

The subsequent development of CATV regulation

in the Second Report and Order has eliminated this distinction.

The com

pulsory carriage rule and major-market/distant-station policy has shifted
the discretion as to which signals are to be carried over a cable sys
tem from the CATV operator to the FCC.

Thus far the FCC has failed to

re-evaluate the 1958 Frontier decision and to project, on a long-term
basis, whether the ultimate role of community antenna television should
be a common carrier.
The legal rationale for the contrary conclusion no longer
has merit since CATV clearly falls within not only the

25

Second Report and Order-1966, p. 782.
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statutory definition but also the Commission’s own
articulation of principles establishing what is a
common c a r r i e r . 26
Two years later on November 26, 1968 Commissioner Cox in Southern
27 *
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co..
' indicated:
. . . . at some time in the future the CATV industry
may develop in such a way that we will have to con
sider whether it should be subject to common carrier
regulation.
For the present, however, I think the
actual conduct of the business of distributing tele
vision ’signals by cable to subscribers for a monthly
fee is not a common carrier activity . . . .28
Commissioner Cox expressed doubt whether the FCC could force CATV opera
tions to become common carriers since, "I see no way in which we could
require the various parties concerned to adjust their relationships so
as to fit common carrier concepts."

29

The Commissioner's statement was

not published until 1969, just after the Commission reached the tentative
conclusion, a turn-about
as common

in policy, that cable operators should operate

carriers on at least some channels.

Commissioner Cox indicated

26
Verrill, "Cablecaster or Common Carrier," p. 607.
27*
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph C o ., 16 F.C.C. 2d., 1969,
pp. 491-495 (concurring statement of Commissioner Kenneth A. Cox and
dissent of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson). This case involved granting
the application of So. Bell Tel. &. Tel. Co. for authority to construct
and operate CATV channel facilities to serve a non-affiliated customer
in Ga. In an earlier decision the Commission ruled that the furnishing
by telephone companies of channels of communications to CATV operators
is a common carrier undertaking. The FCC therefore required telephone
companies to file tariffs covering the provision of such service. (Com
mon Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C. 2d. 257 (1966), p. 260.
The Commission also held in General Telephone Co. of California, 13
F.C.C. 2d. 448 (1968) that the provision of channel service i s a n inter
state common carriage service and that, therefore, telephone companies
must obtain Section 214 authorization from the FCC before constructing
facilities to provide this service. These two cases gave the FCC "in
direct" jurisdiction over CATV.
no

Ibid., p. 492.

29
z Ibid.
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these common carrier operations would represent only a small part of the
ki
•
30
cable
service.

December 12, 1968 Notice Encourages Cable
Systems to Operate as Common Carriers
The Commission's proposal that the public interest would be served
by encouraging CATV systems to operate as common carriers on some chan
nels was contained in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
Inquiry released on December 12, 1968.

31

The rationale behind its

decision was to:
. . . provide an outlet for others to present programs
of their own choosing, free from any control of the CATV
operator as to content except as required by the Commis
sion's rules or applicable law. It might also provide a
low cost outlet for political candidates, possibly adver
tisers, programs on a subscription basis, and various
modestly funded organizations and entities in the commu
nity who ma y be unable to afford time Cu or obtain access
to broadcast facilities. And it might further provide a
means for municipal authorities to fulfill any of their
community needs that are not sufficiently met through
CATV's obligation to act as a local o u t l e t . 32
The Proposed Rulemaking did not require CATV systems to operate as com
mon carriers on some channel(s) but said the cable operator may if he
chose to do so.

The Commission stated its intent to "return to this

issue as the industry develops."

33

30Ibid.
31

Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems (Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking), Docket 18397, 15 F.C.C. 2d., 1968, pp. 417-504;
see also Harold Barnett and Edward Greenberg, "A Proposal for Wired
City Television," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1968, pp. 1-27.
32

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, December 12, 1968, p. 427.

33Ibid.. p. 421.
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A second major provision of the December 12th Notice was the Com
mission's encouragement of cable operators to originate their own pro
gramming*

The FCC felt the public interest would be served by "increasing

the number of local outlets for community self-expression and for
augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services.

if34

This seemingly "harmless" proposal which was implemented in a First
Report and Order in Docket 18397

35

has been a major point of contention

in the present common carrier operations of CATV.

The First Report and

Order in Docket 18397, released on October 24, 1969, established rules
regarding program origination and the standards cable systems would be
required to adhere to in their programming.

Specifically, the rules

stated that on or after January 1, 1971, no CATV system having 3,500 or
more subscribers could carry the signals of any television station unless
the system also operated to a significant extent as a local outlet for
"cablecasting" (the term coined by the FCC to describe CATV program
origination.).

This document not only marked the first move by the FCC

toward allowing CATV something more than a role supplementary to overthe-air broadcasting, it necessitated the need to re-evaluate the role
of CATV systems.

The Commission had for several years regarded CATV as

a business that distributed television signals.

36

Then in its December

12th Notice the FCC encouraged CATV systems to operate as common carriers
but who would exercise no control over program content.

35

Now cable

First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C. 2d., 1969,
pp. 201-236.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., p. 492.
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operators were being forced to originate their own programming.

The

Commission through its rulings, has combined the programming and trans
mitting function of CATV.

The conflict is an economic one.

The cable

operator has an interest in maximizing the audience for his own programs
as against those of competing programmers using leased (common-carrier)
channels.

This conflict of interest is inherent in the cable operator’s

dual role as a programmer in his own right and a common carrier of programs offered by others.

37

The Commission stated its rationale for requiring cablecasting and
encouraging some common carrier operations promoted the basic purpose
for which the Commission was created:
. . . regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com
munication by wire and radio so as to make available, so
far as possible, to all people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reason
able charges. ^
This philosophy, perhaps more than any other, has served as the founda
tion for the subsequent rulings whereby the Commission sought the de
velopment of sufficient channel availability on all CATV systems.

Although

the Commission has yet to require that CATV systems operate as common
carriers, their rulings that set forth channel capacity seem,

a strong

step.in that direction.

37

Stephen R. Barnett, "State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable
Television," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 47, 1972, p. 745.
OO

First Report and Order in Docket 18397, p. 201.
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1970 Second Further Notice Specifies
Multi-Channel Requirements
On July 1, 1970, the FCC released two documents, Notice of Proposed
39
Rulemaking (Docket 18894)
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket 18397-A).

40

The former document served to notify cable

operators that the Commission intended to continue to require "minimum
system capacities adequate to serve foreseeable demand, and thus caution
operators to avoid the economic burden of installing inadequate capacity
that will soon need to be expanded at extra cost."

41

The Commission

did not specify a minimum channel capacity, but mentioned that 20-channel
systems were proposed by many cable operators in the larger markets.
The second document set forth specific requirements to provide sufficient
channel availability.

These include:

A)

Local government channel: at least one channel for
use without charge by local government and for free
political broadcasts during primary and general
elections.

B)

Local public access channels: in order to facili
tate further presentation of views, cable systems
will be required to make channel time available on
one or more channels at no cost, to local citizens
or groups, which are not engaged in programming for
advertising revenue, but which desire to present
views on matters of concern to them.

C)

Leased channels: cable operators would make available
to third parties, either permanently or on a one-shot
basis, channels for commercial operation by third parties.

39

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket 18894), 25 F.C.C. 2d., 1970,
pp. 38-57.
40

Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket 18397-A),
24 F.C.C. 2d., 1970, pp. 580-621.
41

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1970, p. 40.
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D)

Channels devoted to instructional uses (e.g. courses
conducted for students either by or in c.oord5.nation
with public or private institutions; instruction by
professional groups for their members, doctors, en
gineers, etc*). We ask for comment on the number of
such channels (e.g., a specified number; a percen
tage of the system's capacity) . ^

The Commission requested comments on its proposals that systems of twenty
or more channels provide at least

50

percent of their channels, on

a demand basis, for the purpose specified in the Second Further Notice
43
of Proposed Rulemaking.

In regards to the leased channels, the Com

mission re-emphasized their importance and promised to take"appropriate
action to insure their availability (e.g., that the rates charged in
such channels are reasonable and nondiscriminatory)„" 44

Although the

Commission did not use the words "common carrier," its specification
that the rates charged for the leased channel must be reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, thus implies at least a modified form of common
carrier access*

45

Cable Television Report and Order Sets Forth Rules
Governing Use of Nonbroadcast Channels
The present rules governing community antenna television, the Cable
46
Television Report and Order,
was released on February 12, 1972 and is

42

Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1970, p. 587.

43-... ,
Ibid.
44
45

Ibid., footnote 14.

Howard M. Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV:
37 Brooklyn Law Review, Vol. 37, 1971, p. 536.
46
3341.

Problems and Proposals,"

Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, pp. 3252-
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best known as the "consensus agreement,"

The prelude to the most recent

cable television regulation has been characterized by Nicholas Johnson:
In future years, when students of law or government wish
to study the decision making process at its worst, when
they look for examples of industry domination of govern
ment, when they look for Presidential interference in the
operation of an agency responsible to Congress, they will
look to the FCC handling of the never-ending saga of cable
television as a classic case.^?
For more than three years the Commission gathered data, solicited views,
heard arguments, evaluated studies, examined alternatives and finally
turned to public panel discussions (unique in communications rule
making) in order to substantiate its current regulatory effort.

The

rules the Commission finally adopted are the result of a number of
interwoven proceedings.

48

In February, 1969, and March, 1971, oral

presentations were heard between the Commission and recognized authori
ties regarding specific issues of cable television regulation.

Fol

lowing these public proceedings the Commission formulated a plan for
cable television, "designed to allow for fulfillment of the techno
logical promise of cable and, at the same time, to maintain the
existing structure of broadcasting."

49

These proposals were described before Congress and a formal "Letter
of Intent"

50

was released on August 5, 1971, which described in detail

the course the FCC planned to adopt.

But the "Letter of Intent" was

47

Steven R. Rivkin, Cable Television: A Guide to Federal Regula
tion (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1138-NSF), March, 1973, p. 210.
48
49
50

Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3253.
Ibid.

FCC, Report tq^Congress, CATV Regulation, "Letter of Intent-" re
printed in 22 P & F Radio Reg. 2d., 1971, pp. 1755-1772.
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met with sharp criticism particularly from broadcasters and copyright
owners but with support from the White House and FCC chairman Dean Burch one
result of the conflicts -among

these four parties prompted a meeting

where z
. . . the vested economic interests-^broadcasters (who
felt threatened by this new technological competition),
copyright holders (who were afraid cable systems would
diminish the value of their products), and the cable
industry (who felt threatened by the political power
of the broadcasters--once joined by Chairman Burch and
the President-*”to stop our August 5 policy entirely in
Congress)--met with the representatives of the White
House and with FCC Chairman Burch . . . .^1
Within three months the "consensus agreement" was born.

Under the cir

cumstances which the present cable regulations were conceived, it is
not surprising, perhaps, that the Commission’s proposals for common
carrier access differed little from the 1970 Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, even after extensive hearings before the Commission
by members of the American Civil Liberties Union, the primary advocates
of common carrier access.

52

Several sections of the 1972 Cable Tele-

vision Report and Order addressed themselves to access to and use of
nonbroadcast channels.
Sec. 120--The rules require 20 channel capacity (actual
or potential) in the top 100 markets, also ad
ditional channel 6 MHz in width suitable for
transmission of Class II or Class III signals.

^"4livkin, A Guide to Federal Regulation, p. 215.
52

Statements of John de J. Pemberton, Jr. on behalf of New York
Civil Liberties Union on Proposed Franchise Grants for Cable Service in
the Borough of Manhattan, July 23, 1970; testimony to Illinois Commerce
Commission by Jerrold N. Oppenheim on March 1, 1971; Irwin Karp before
FCC on March 18, 1971. (Unpublished in FCC Reports)

\
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Sec, 121— In order to promote program diversity cable
television systems will have to provide one
dedicated, noncommercial public access chan
nel available without charge at all times on
a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory
basis and, without charge during a develop
mental period, one channel for educational
use and another channel for local government
use,
Sec • 122— The encouragement of UHF television was used
to foster local service broadcasting; the pub
lic access channel will offer a practical op
portunity to participate in community dialogue
through a mass medium, A system operator will
be obliged to provide only use of the channel
without charge, but production cost (aside from
live studio presentations not exceeding 5 min
utes in length) may be charged to users.
Sec, 125— In addition to the designated channels and
broadcast channels, cable systems shall make
available for leased use the remainder of the
required bandwidth; if the public, education,
and Government access channels are not being
used, they may be used for leased operation.
Sec, 126— A new channel must be made operational whenever
all operational channels are in use during 80
percent of the weekdays, for 80 percent of the
time during any consecutive 3-hour period for 6
weeks running, the system will then have 6
months in which to make a new channel available.
(Known as the "N plus 1" rule)
Sec, 128— Requires CATV operators to install return commu
nication facilities on at- least a non-voice basis.
Sec. 136— The Commission recognized that open access car
ries with it certain risks, but that regulation
awaits experience. Commission will explore the
feasibility of providing a lock switch to cut
off public access or leased channels, should
subscribers wish to control channel selection.
Sec. 137— Encourages experimentation in regards to the best
way to handle applications for access time, how
production facilities will be provided, how the
public can obtain advance notice of which programs
will be presented, etc.

66

Sec. 140--Eases cable operators concerns about potential
civil and criminal liability resulting from
use of the public and leased access channels.
Since the cable operator has no control over
content, it is unlikely that a suit would be
brought against any CATV system over libelous
material.
Sec. 143--The Commission encourages refinement of half-inch
video tape and recording equipment that will be
available to the public which does not conform to
technical broadcast standards.
Sec. 146— The suggestion has been made that cable tele
vision systems be prohibited from originating
their own programming and be restricted entirely
to a common carrier role. We have considered
these possibilities but feel that it would be
premature to adopt either at this time. At this
stage in the development of the cable industry,
it is the system operator who has the greatest
incentive to produce originated material attrac
tive to existing and potential subscribers. We
have tried to encourage this origination both
through our origination rules and by structuring
the broadcast signal carriage rules to stimulate
the development of nonbroadcast services. At the v
same time, we have recognized that during this
developmental stage we should not adopt rules that
constrain experimentation and innovation in the
services that.cable systems provide but, rather,
that we should seek to keep our future options
open. When cable penetration reaches high levels
and demand increases for leased channel operations,
we will revisit this matter. For now, we remain
of the view that the most appropriate mix for the
orderly development of cable and for encouraging
the maximization of its potential for public bene
fit is one that embraces . . . a multipurpose CATV
operation combining carriage of broadcast signals
with program origination and common carrier service.
These access rules will be applicable to all new systems that become
operational after March 31, 1972, in the top 100 markets.

Systems cur

rently operating in those markets have until March 31, 1977, to comply.

53

Cable Television Report and Order, pp. 3269-3272.
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Common Carrier Experimentation
On July 14, 1972, the FCC made public its Reconsideration of Report
54
and Order wherein the Commission acknowledged the American Civil Liber
ties Union's challenge of the Commission's authority to require cable
systems serving 3,500 or more subscribers to originate their own pro
gramming while urging common carrier operations on some cable channels.
Answering the ACLU, the FCC referred back to their consideration in the
1972 Cable Television Report and Order;
The ACLU's approach, which may prove sound eventually,
at the present time does not afford the industry the
flexibility that we desire to encourage experimentation
and innovation.
Further, we doubt very much if, in new
systems in major markets, a scarcity of access channels
will arise from a cable operator's excessive use of band
width for his own origination purposes; but if a problem
should arise, we shall be alert to take action to main
tain our emphasis on the provision of a c c e s s c h a n n e l s . ^5
The brief history of common carrier doctrine in relation to commu
nity antenna television can be characterized by a regulatory turn-about.
At first the FCC in Frontier Broadcasting

Co. deemed cable television

not to be a common carrier because the customer exercised no choice in
selecting the television signals that were to be delivered.

The healthy

survival of UHF broadcasting seemed to be an underlying factor in the
FCC's compulsory carriage and major-market/distant-station policies
which in turn seemed to negate the rationale of the Frontier case.
Commission has yet to re-evaluate the Frontier decision.

The

A conflict

arose in subsequent legislation due to the dual role that the Commission

54
Reconsideration of Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, pp. 1384813910. —
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55Ibid., p. 13857.
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placed CATV systems under by requiring cablecast5„ng and encouraging com
mon carrier operations on some cable channels.
state of flux.

Currently, CATV is in a

The FCC does not regulate cable television as a common

carrier but has encouraged operators to experiment as common carriers
on some channels.

The Commission says it intends to revisit the matter

at a later stage in the development of cable.

"It is, nevertheless,

an issue which must be resolved before CATV achieves large-scale, multi
channel capacity; vesting control of forty or more communication channels
in one entity invites their abuse."

56

^^Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 839.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMON CARRIER CABLE TELEVISION

The economics of a common carrier cable system are complex.

The

preceding chapters have examined the technological and regulatory aspects
of a common carrier CATV system.

Reception problems inherent in multi

channel cable systems await the development of more sophisticated broad
cast equipment and scholars feel with some farsightedness on the part of
government agencies some of the regulatory problems could become un
tangled.

But the issue of cable economics is a different story.

While

experts feel the technological and regulatory problems can be somewhat
stabilized, economically cable television is subject to fluctuations of
the marketplace.

To further complicate matters, cable television opera

tors are not only burdened with the problems of rate structures, but as
broadcasters they must face the issues inherent in that industry as well,
including program costs and advertising.
These two areas, CATV rate regulation coupled with the programming
function of cable television, pose complicated problems.

Regulation of Subscription Fees and Access
Rates Poses Economic Problems
Regulation of rates by cable companies has been a sensitive issue.
Fear of public-utility ratemaking on the classic rate-of-return model
has been a principal reason for the cable industry’s opposition to any
type of common carrier or public utility status.
69

Industry spokesmen

7°

usually point to the case of Connecticut as an example of how state reg
ulation (including rate regulation) has completely stifled cable growth.*
Rate regulation for common carrier CATV has three aspects?
regulation of rates for rental of studio equipment,

(a) the

(b) the regulation

of rates which subscribers pay to receive the cable services and (c) the
regulation of rates which users pay to lease a channel.

2

An argument

against regulating the first aspect is possible since the business of
renting studio equipment is not a natural monopoly.

3

However, the

purpose of requiring the CATV company to maintain a studio is to insure
that the citizens who can least afford to buy their own equipment will
have feasible opportunity for access to this medium.

Hence, rate regu

lation of the rental of studio equipment can be justified as a necessary
and integral aspect of common carrier CATV.

4

The second and third areas

of rate regulation are closely related since both the user and subscriber
pay to receive the benefit of a given channel.

For example, a subscriber

who pays $10 per month to receive twenty channels of programming pays
$.50 per month per channel.

A user who leases one of those channels also

pays a monthly, daily or hourly fee for that same channel.

Thus,

assuming the profits of the CATV company are regulated on a full cost
basis, the regulation of access rates

will necessitate

the

Office of the General Counsel, National Cable Television Associa
tion, "The CATV Industry & Regulation," (pamphlet, no page numbers or
date).
2
Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.
3
Richard Posner, "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation," Stanford
Law Review, Vol. 21, 1970, p. 575.
^Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.
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regulation
latedness

of s u b s c r i b e r
between

rates.

5

The

i n t e r r-e-

t h e . rates being charged to users and those

to subscribers presents the problem of how these rates should be
apportioned.

Lack of Economic Guidelines Makes the Establishment
of a "Fair Rate-of"Return1’ Difficult

By far the most controversial aspect of rate regulation for common
carrier cable television is in establishing a "fair" rate of return.
One proposal calls for a regulatory commission which would ascertain
rate base, rate strueture,allowed rate of return, etc.

Such issues

as valuation of equipment costs, anticipated obsolescence, marginal
cost factors and market forces would have to be considered by the
regulatory commission.
The economic complexities of a CATV common carrier are probably
most evident, in the circular process of determining a standard for a
"fair rate of return."
An appropriate definition of the fair rate of return
must take into account the risk characteristics of the
investment.
But these risk characteristics in turn are
determined in large part by the behavior of the
regulatory commission. How much variance there will
be in the earnings of a regulated company depends upon
how often the regulatory agency re-determines the rate struc
ture and the allowed rate of return and wnau basis it
uses for such determinations. There are no investment
risks which are really comparable to those involved in
investment in a regulated utility other than investment
in another regulated utility. Thus, many state regula
tory commissions in an effort to escape circularity

5Ibid.
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set their allowed rate of return by reference to the
return allowed in the state next door. Cumulatively,
the results of this process are not satisfactory.6
There are numerous plans and objections to rate-of-return regulation in
general which cannot be discussed at length here.

It is important to

point out the complexities and hazards to economic regulation of rela
tively new ventures such as cable television.

Although many existing

cable companies have been quite profitable from the outset, extension
of cable into major urban markets already served by multiple television
stations probably involves substantial financial risk.

If rate-of-

return regulation which minimizes the reward for entrepreneurship is
imposed, businessmen might be discouraged from starting new ventures
into the cable television industry.

The extension of common carrier

principles to the regulation of rates on the cable involves numerous
practical and theoretical problems.
Whatever the merits from the point of view of diversity
of access to giving the cable common carrier status an
economic analysis counsels caution before applying the
rate-setting aspects of common carrier regulation.7
State Public Utility Regulation of CATV
Resembles Common Carrier Regulation
The problem of rate regulation for cable television is far

more

significant than merely determining specified rate bases and rate
structures, and has become a key point of contention between those who
advocate local vs. state vs*, federal regulation of cable television.

Leonard M. Ross, Economic and Legal Aspects of CATV Systems
(Working Paper IX, Prepared for Center for Policy Research and Columbia
University), 1972, p. 146.
^Ibia., p. 154.
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The regulatory problem overlaps economic issues and vice-versa.
When the need for regulation finally became apparent
however, response came from every governmental level
--cities, states and the Federal Government. This
surge of activity has produced a regulatory nightmare
haunted by overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting
regulations•®
This dilemma has come to be known as "three-tier regulation."

Arguments

have been built supporting regulation at each level of government.

Al

though these arguments are not within the scope of this study, this
multi-jurisdictional system of CATV regulation could pose the thorny
constitutional problem of deciding which regulatory scheme to sustain
for common carrier operations.
On the local level, planning and franchising CATV systems must take
place within the framework of federal and state laws.

Local authority

to franchise and regulate cable television derives from the cable systcm*s
need for access to city streets, utility poles and other rights-of-way.
The recent Cable Television Report and Order contains rules and guide
lines that strongly affect the choices open to local franchising
authorities.

The FCC limits franchise fees to 5 percent of total sub

scribers revenues and requires a special showing if the fee is more than
3 percent.

9

The franchising authority must show that the higher fee is

justified by a local regulatory program for cable.

The Commission also

requires that rates for leased channels be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

Federal and local regulation of rates and revenues has been some

what unstructured.

The primary significance of three-tier regulation is

Q

Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 816.
9

Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3281.
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the move in the past three years toward enactment of legislation sub
jecting cable television to state regulation through the state’s exis
ting public utilities commission.

This action is directly related to

this study, as public utility regulation resembles common carrier
regulations in some r e s p e c t s . T h e

legal basis for this action stems

from TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor*-*- in which the Supreme Court held that
states, and by implication local government, had the power to regulate
those aspects of CATV upon which the FCC had not acted.
12
13
14
Before 1971, five states--Connecticut,
Nevada,
Rhode Island,
Vermont,

15

and Hawaii

16

had each adopted legislation creating a state

regulatory commission to govern CATV.

In 1971 New York

17

and New Jersey

18

imposed a one-year moratorium on the franchises of cable systems while
legislatures sought to devise a state regulatory plan.
.19
20
Illinois
and Massachusetts

Two states,

followed this action in January, 1972.

^ S o l Schildhause, Chief, Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communi
cations Commission, personal letter, May 25, 1973.
U TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 15 P A F Radio Ree.. (D. Nev.). 1968.
pp. 2004-ZI13.-- — ------ 1--^Conn.

Stats, ch. 289, sec. 16-330 to 333 (1966 Rev.).

^^Nev. Rev. Stat. 711.010 et seg. (Supp. 1971).
14R.I . Gen. Laws Ann. sec. 39-19-1 et seg. (Supp. 1970).
15Vt. Stat. Ann. ch. 30, sec. 501 et seg. (Supp. 1971).
^ 1 9 7 0 Hawaii Laws ch. 114.
*^N.Y. Gen. Munic. Laws sec. 88 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
*®New Jersey Laws (1971) Reg. Sess. ch. 221.
19

Illinois Commerce Commission, Investigation of Cable Television
and Other Forms of Broadband Cable Communications in the State of Illinois,
reprinted in 22 P A F Radio Reg. 2d., 1971, pp. 2192-2206.

20

Mass. Gen. Laws (1971) Reg. Sess. ch. 113.
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State regulation of cable TV is pending in Iowa

21

.

and California.

22

The states now regulating CATV placed cable within the general scheme
of public utility regulation by statutory enactment.

In addition to

requiring that cable systems obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity and filing tariff schedules, these states establish at
least the semantic basis for rate regulation by classifying CATV as a
public utility.

There are significant differences in each state’s

approach to the issue of rate regulation.

Only the Nevada statute

explicitly gives its commission the power to set rates; the Connec
ticut statute limits the "rates of return to the amount that is fair,
just and reasonable."

23

Vermont is completely silent on the matter

while the Rhode Island statute prohibits discriminatory rates
does not explicitly give its

25

24

but

commission any power to make rates.

These commissions have a general authority to regulate public
utility rates which presumably extends to CATV by nature of their
definition.

The cable industry has a traditional fear of state regu

lation and there appears to be a certain hesitancy on the part of some
states to impose it, perhaps due to the belief that CATV lacks

21

Barnett, "Regulation of Cable Television," p. 687.

22

Senate Bills #1330, #754, introduced by Senator Anthony Beilenson,
May 7, 1973, and Senator Alfred E. Alquist, April 2, 1973, California
State Capitol Bill Room.
23

Howard E. Hausman, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission, State
of Connecticut, personal letter, June 9, 1973.
A /

Susan M. Hudson, Public Service Board, State of Vermont, personal
letter, July 11, 1973.
25

Loraine Silberthau, Division of Public Utilities and Carriers,
State of Rhode Island and Providence: Plantations, personal letter,
June 21, 1973.
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sufficient public utility characteristics to constitutionally support
such a regulation.
doubtful.

26

According to scholars, this proposition seems

CATV systems usually have an exclusive franchise and thus

fall within any classical definition of public utility.

Furthermore,

even if a cable company does not have an exclusive franchise, it cer
tainly seems to meet the Supreme Court's exceedingly liberal test of
a business "affected with a public interest."

27

The real problem with cable rate regulation seems to be its stan
dards.

The use of traditional evaluation methods creates a risk of

setting the rate base either too high or too low.

Since CATV involves

a large initial investment with small immediate return, a newlyconstructed CATV system may require setting an artifically low rate
base.

On the other hand, if the CATV system is well-established and

has been
would

depreciated over a substantial period of time, a higher base

be appropriate.

Thus, rates must be based upon*a flexible formula

that correlates the high cost of constructing a CATV system with the
28
comparatively low cost of operating it.
Proposals That Attempt to Establish Reasonable
Subscription Fees and Access Rates
Subscription and Access Costs Charged On a
Per Channel, Per Month Basis
One proposal is that the rates for all non-commercial users be
regulated so that the cost per channel per month will be the same as the
96

Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 824.

‘“^Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S., 1877, p. 113.
28
Botein, "Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 825.

the monthly subscription cost, divided by the number of channels and
multiplied by the number of subscribers.

29

Thus the cost of sending a

one hour program will be equal to the total cost all CATV subscribers
pay to receive that program--whether or not they watch it.
proposal

30

Another

is that the subscriber pay a nominal monthly charge which

would cover upkeep of the system and allow him to receive the local
broadcast stations.

In addition, the subscriber could choose from the

available cable programming and pay a per-program cost, receiving an
itemized bill at the end of the month.

The cost for each program will

include a fixed fee for channel usage plus any charges imposed by the
user.

Thus a locally produced, non-commercial program might cost the

home subscriber a few cents (the user's transmission costs divided by
the number of viewers of that program) unless the non-commercial user
was willing to pay his own transmission costs.

Assuming advertisers

will be willing to subsidize the transmission costs of some programs,
local commercial programs will be free to the subscriber.

The disad

vantage of this proposal is that non-commercial users such as politicians,
will be faced with the choice of either paying for the time themselves
or requiring the viewer to pay to hear their message.

A combination

of these proposals might allow educational and cultural institutions
to be given preferential rate treatment, and political candidates in the
particular franchise area an equal allotment of free time, both sub-

29
30

Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.

Leiand Johnson, The Future of Cable Television:
Some Problems
of Federal Regulation (Rand Corp. Memo. RM-6199-FF), January, 1970,
pp. 56-61.
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sidized by increasing the monthly cost to all subscribers— whether or
not they wish to watch these programs.

31

Allow Rates to be Determined by
the Economic "Marketplace"
On the opposite side of the issue, is the belief that common car
rier access to cable systems can be achieved by a regulation imposing
the requirement that access to channels be provided on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis and that no further regulation of rate level or
return is warranted in cable systems for the forseeable future.

32

This approach is supported by the difficulties of
arriving at any coherent regulatory standard for reg
ulating rate levels or rates of return. Commonly,
rate levels for utilities are supposed to provide a
reasonable return on investment-rate base. This
traditional concept would be difficult to apply in
the present situation. Cable systems have been
initiated on the basis of subscriber payments. The
cable operator will receive revenues from subscribers
fees (which are not now regulated) and from adver
tising on its own program originations (which are
not likely to be controlled)•33
One of the primary arguments for minimal rate regulation is based
on the belief that for cable to grow, it must be allowed a great deal
of freedom.
At this particular point in time, at the beginning
of the hoped for communications revolution, restric
tions and regulations can only prevent allowing the

31Ibid., p. 26.
32

Lionel Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications:
Regulatory and Economic Issues (A Report for the Sloan Commission),
August, 1971, p. 17.
33
J Ibid.
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evolution of cable to its full potential*
Instead of
anticipating problems, perhaps we would do well to wait
and take actions when problems actually evolve.^
The cable industry is a high risk business, and contrary to popu
lar belief, "urban cable TV systems are not unlimited roads to immediate
riches."

35

As a capital-intensive business, cable operators must invest

a great deal more to generate a dollar of income than many other indus
tries.

For first generation cable, plant commitment alone, excluding

operating and other expenses was three dollars invested for each dollar
in sales.

Television station investment runs about a dollar investment

for everydollar in sales and in some areas* TV sales may run
in plant expense.

ten dollars

Cable earnings were one-fifth the revenue of the

broadcast industry, but had half as much total capital committed.

As

cable operators move into the urban areas, capital investment may be
more than doubled.

Instead of a minimum of $80 to $120 which is today's

investment per subscriber in plant cost, approximately $450 per subscriber is anticipated to build tomorrow's major market system.

37

Corporations generally are able to fund 60 to 70 percent of their
requirements from internal sources.

Cable will be fortunate if it can

generate 20 to 25 percent of its capital requirements in the next ten
years.

3^

Lois Brown, "Common Carrier: Is This the Public Interest?" (Report
Prepared for Metrotel Communications, Inc., Philadelphia), 1972, p. 4.
^ I b i d ., p. 5.
36T,
'
Ibid., p. 7.
37
Communication News, untitled article, July, 1972, p. 17.
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There is a need for a vast amount of external long term
financing. An unfavorable regulatory climate will cer
tainly make finaneing a great deal more difficult in
some cases virtually impossible to obtain . . . . In
addition to the need to provide some incentive for
prospective investors, and some promise of a reasonable
return for the operator, a relatively high level of
earnings is required for the type of local program pro
duction we all hope to see. To restrict subscription
fees instead of allowing them to be determined by the
market-place would be to place unfair, and at this point
unnecessary burdens upon the i n d u s t r y .

Establish Different Classifications of Access Users
and Charge a Flat Fee
A proposal that has been supported by the American Civil Liberties
Union is to charge a flat fee to lease channels as opposed to allowing
the cable operator to charge either a share of the revenue or a percen
tage of profit.

This plan would set up functional classifications of

users (i.e. educators community groups) with different regulated fees
for such users.

39

The basis for this proposal is that the cable opera

tor would discriminate against some kinds of users without such pro
visions, as in some cases he might be able to obtain 50 percent of the
profits and if so he would avoid educational, low income or non-profit
users.
But there are some who feel the ACLU proposal is fallacious. Since
there are functional classifications of users with different rate
schedules, the operator could still discriminate by showing preference
for one classification of user over another unless regulated further.

38
39

Brown, "Common Carrier:
Ibid., p. 12.

A0Ibid.

Is This the Public Interest?" p. 8.
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In other fields of communication or transportation, as has pre
viously been discussed, the law requires a common carrier to make its
facilities available to all members of the general public at rates set
by a governmental regulatory authority.

Usually the authority is

directed by statute to set an overall level of rates designed to afford
the carrier a fair rate of return on its invested capital.

The regula

tory commission may be instructed to assure that the rates are "fair"
and "nondiscriminatory" and may require the carrier to make its service
physically available (by extending a railway line or a telecommunica
tions pathway) to all residents in a given geographical area.

In

short, the institution of "common carrier" regulation customarily en
tails a related series of restrictions on rates, services, equipment
and access— enforced by a regulatory agency.

CHAPTER V

£a t v p r o g r a m m i n g c o n f l i c t s w i t h c o m m o n c a r r i e r s t a t u s

At present, virtually all cable systems are owned by private cor
porations.

They are allowed to operate by virtue of having obtained a

franchise from the local municipality or in some cases the state govern
ment .

The franchise agreement may obligate the cable system owner to

provide dedicated channels available free of charge to the local govern
ment, the school system or other agencies*

It may prohibit certain kinds

of programming such as "pay cable" programs for which a separate charge
is made for receiving that particular program.
additional kinds of programs:

T h e .FCC also mandates

distant signal carriage is subject to

strict regulation and minimal cable-sponsored origination of programming
is required for systems with more than a stipulated minimum number of
subscribers.

Aside from these restrictions and those dealing with the

Fairness Doctrine and equal-time rules, the cable operator is himself
the judge of what will and will not be transmitted over the cable.

As

a result, some scholars have suggested that the requirement for CATV to
operate as a common carrier is unnecessary; a rational cable entrepreneur
would, in the normal course of profit maximization make channel space
able to any other entrepreneur who could use it more effectively than he
could himself.

But concern has been expressed about possible conflic

ting interests inherent in common carrier CATV.

82

avail

83
First it is contended by communication experts that any marginal
economic benefits from common carrier access would be outweighed by the
*

system operator* s concern over possible adverse impact upon him of use
of such
sive

channels because it could subject him to liability, be

offen-.

to subscribers or violate his duties for balanced presentations.^

Second it is felt that common carrier access would conflict with the
interests of cable operators in their own programming originations.

2

FCC Prohibits Program Censorship But has Failed
to Explicitly Grant Immunity to CATV Operators
Liability has been a thorny issue since the beginning of the common
carrier doctrine.

Now there are some serious considerations posed in

regards to the legal liability of broadcasters for the dissemination of
libelous, fraudulent or obscene material.

The common course Of action

a cable operator has taken is to exercise control over content in order
to protect himself.

But since the cable system provides instantaneous

access into subscribers' homes, it seems unacceptable to the public for
the operator to avoid all responsibility, particularly in relation to
the transmitting of obscene material.

A common carrier precedent is the

telephone system's practice to avoid transmission of known illegal
matter, including obscene material which it enforces by termination
of service.

"A similar obligation is appropriate here."

Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 26.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 29.

Concern has also been expressed about the prospect of vocal extrem
ists using common carrier channels for sensationalism or political con
frontations •
The ground for such concern may be exaggerated; a rabble
rouser on one of the ten cable channels may obtain no
greater public recognition than he would speaking on a
street corner, or public park.4
Common carrier cable would in part be an electronic public forum and
thus carries with it many of the same problems inherent in the First
Amendment.
There is also the question of fraud and libel and most communica
tion scholars agree it is proper to hold the programmer liable, not the
cable system.

5

If the cable system assumed responsibility, this would

lead to prior screening of program content, which is inconsistent with
the concept of common carrier access.
Perhaps the unsettled issue of CATV liability can be adequately
accomodated within present law.

Cable system immunity seems to be sup

ported by the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions which have dras
tically narrowed newspaper liability for libel related to public issues
permitting recovery only for actual malice.^

Furthermore, the FCC's

requirement that cable systems operate as common carriers on some chan
nels may itself exempt the cable operator from liability.

In 1959 in

the WDAY case^ the Supreme Court held that the statutory obligation of

^Ibid., p. 32.
5Ibid., p. 29.
^The New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., 1964, p. 254.
^Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota
Division v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S., 1959, pp. 525-547.

a broadcaster to provide equal access to political candidates with the
explicit stipulation that broadcast licensees could not censor,estab
lished an immunity for broadcasters against any liability for defamatory
statements made in such political broadcasts.

An argument could be made

that the required operation on a common carrier basis b5>- cable companies
could be interpreted within the scope of the federal statute set forth
in WDAY.
The recent rulings by the FCC, although explicit in wording, seem
to cloud the issue.

The FCC has declared that cable operators "should

have no control over program content except as may be required by the
g
Commission's rules and applicable law."
The New York City franchise
also provides that programming on leased channels "shall be free from
any control by the Company except as is required to protect the Company
from liability under applicable law."

9

The rulings do not clarify what

the "applicable law" is, or whether it can be altered by a regulation
imposing common carrier status.
Apart from the legal aspects of liability, cable operators may be
concerned that an open access could result in dissemination of material
offensive to some people.
Like a broadcaster, a system operator prefers the goodwill
of the public and will be sensitive to criticism particu
larly in the developmental stage of his system. No doubt
it is for this reason that many cable operators regard the
common carrier proposal as a threat or at least as a
nuisance.
It is understandable that they have resisted
attempts to experiment with common carrier access.
It

8
Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3289.
9
Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
p. 49.

86
is obviously impossible to expect a cable system operator
to voluntarily undertake such a policy, so long as he can
not in the eyes of the community disclaim the responsibility
for the programming. The latter obstacle, at least, should
be overcome if the common carrier obligation were imposed
upon him as a matter of law. *-0

CATV Operator's Obligation to Grant Channel Access
May Conflict with Program Origination Requirement
The FCC has required that all cable systems having 3,500 or more
subscribers will be required to utilize one channel for origination
of substantial amounts of programming.

The validity of this ruling

is justified by the fact that, at low levels of cable penetration, the
principal economic value of program diversity will be to attract sub
scribers.

As cable penetration reaches substantial proportions, com

mercial opportunities increase.

Concern has been expressed that a con

flict may then develop between the cable operator's interests as a
broadcaster on the origination channel and his obligations to provide
access to others."^
It is believed that the cable operator, like other broadcasters
would be strongly averse to fragmenting his audience by programming on
additional channels, and may seek to reduce such usage by excessive
rates or other tactics.

In contrast to this view is the idea that:

The danger of conflict-of-interest is lessened in as much
as the system operator is already competing for audience
with local and distant over-the-air signals so that the
additional impact of common carrier users is not likely
to be substantial. Moreover, the objective requirement of
^
large channel capacity should prevent exclusionary tendencies.
10
Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 32.
Ibid., p. 26.
12Ibid.. p. 27.
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Nevertheless, there may be basis for this concern at a later stage when
cable penetration is higher and more stable.

At that point, the incen

tive to add or the risk of losing subscribers will be low, and the
cable operator's interest in enhancing the revenues of his origination
channel may become significant.

Perhaps, the ultimate solution to this

problem would be to require the cable company to cease engaging in pro
gramming and begin operations as a common carrier when a cable system
achieves a certain size.

This solution has been incorporated by the

New York Public Service Commission:

"when any single system, operated

substantially as a coordinated whole reaches a certain size (say 50,000
subscribers), the Public Service Commission shall have authority to
direct that the system be converted into a 'communications common

13*

carrier!" "

This plan would allow the cable operator to engage in

programming through separate affiliates.

This approach seems adequate

to avert problems of discrimination which throughout the history of
the common carrier doctrine have been substantial.
Any tendency the cable system might have to reduce
the number of competitive program services would be
prevented by the nondiscriminatory rates available
to others (as well as its affiliate) and the unavoid
able existence of unused channels on the basis of the
installed capacity of the system.

Jones, Regulation of Cable Television bv the State of New York,
p. 199.
"k

This is a familiar pattern for the FCC which adopted a similar
pattern toward telephone companies engaging in data processing activi
ties; it permitted them to do so through separate corporate affiliates
subject to segragation of accounts, prohibition of favoritism to carrier
affiliates, and other safeguards (Docket 16974, Computer Communications
Inquiry, April 1, 1970).
14
Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications9 p. 28.
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The Distinction Between Common Carrier
S tatus and "Public Access'*
Proposals for common carrier status for CATV are designed to elim
inate the conjectured conflict between the cable operator's interest as a
broadcaster and his obligation to grant access to others.

These proposals

contend that ownership of the cable system should carry no special say
over program content.

The cable operator should be required to make time

available to all comers on equal terms.

In this manner, the general user

would become the program authority, and the owner of the cable system
would be relegated to a role as a kind of "traffic-.cop."

15

The primary advocate of common carrier cable television has been the
American Civil Liberties Union.

Their reasons for advocating common

carrier status are stated thusly:
1.

Cable television is technically capable of serving as a common
carrier.

2.

Common carrier cable systems would assure full freedom of expres
sion and communication.

All sides on any political or social

issue could have access to the cable system without need of a
"fairness doctrine."
3.

A common carrier cable system will more effectively serve the
public interest.

The physical and economic limitations of over-

the-air broadcasting severely limit diversity of programming.

16

15
Ross, Economic and Legal Aspects of CATV Systems, p. 117.
^Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union in the Matter of
Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regula
tions Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into
the Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate
Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, Docket
#18397-A, March 18, 1971. (unpublished in FCC Reports)
\
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But as this study has already revealed, methods must be found to solve
the problems of rate regulation, liability, poor reception and alloca
tion of available channels.
The creation of a common carrier formula is, of course,
far more difficult for CATV than for a telephone or
telegraph company. As one commentator has indicated,
any definition of non-discriminatory access to CATV
involves many quasi-subjective determinations, e.g.,
evaluating the time shown, the channel used and the
adjacent program. Although the problem is obviously
not subject to exact resolution, some attempt must
be made to formulate standards.1?
Perhaps a problem in formulating standards for common carrier CATV
is one of semantics.

The Federal Communications Commission and advo

cates of common carrier status often use the term "public access."
Lately, the terms "common carrier" and "public access" are used so
interchangeably that they are often treated as one-and-the-same.

But

there is a basic difference, at least frbm a regulatory standpoint.
Pure and total common carrier regulation as applied to cable TV would
completely separate the ownership of the cable system from any power to
decide what the cable system is to transmit.

The cable operator's role

would be restricted to leasing channels to others, and regulation would
assure that producers and distributors could lease channels at fair and
reasonable terms.

The system owner could not supply any services or

originate any programming himself.

18

It seems that advocates of common

carrier access to cable do not propose in their regulatory scheme pure
and total common carrier cable because:

^Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 839.
18

Brown, "Common Carrier:

Is This the Public Interest?" p. 2.

9Q
. . . this.would mean that the CATV system could not carry
existing broadcast stations without payment for channel
leasing by the broadcast industry, i.e., local broadcast
stations as well as imported signals would be treated
the same way as any other "user” of any kind, and would
have to pay the cable operator to transmit the broadcast
signals.
It is very doubtful that broadcasters would pay cable operators for
signal transmission and without over-the-air broadcast signals, especi
ally distant signals, CATV could not survive.

What advocates seem to

be asking for is a modified version of the common carrier doctrine.
Public access is a fairly new phenomenon.

During the FCC's landmark

panel hearings on CATV in March, 1971, where the present regulatory
policies were being debated there was also the growing crescendo of
Voices asking for "access" to cable television.

These demands were

based on the premise that from a technological standpoint, CATV could
provide an unlimited number of channels.

The terms "common carrier" or

"public access" have come to mean a hands-off policy regarding govern
ment regulation of CATV.

Cable television seems to be evolving from

a business of merely providing clearer television reception to a concept
of participatory television.

Any person with an idea will have access

to the communications system; a person will be able to talk back to
his television set.

20

To understand the difference between common carrier and public
access, the development of the latter needs to be examined.

19

20

As has been

Ibid.

Nicholas Johnson and Gary G. Gerlock, "The Coming Fight for Cable
Access," Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2, 1972. p. 218.
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pointed out, there are many economic and legal implications implicit in
the common carrier doctrine.

But the roots of the public access concept

are philosophical in nature.

To come to grips with this is to under

stand the conflict between the optimistic cry for "public access" on the
one hand, and the economic, legal and technical "realities" of the cable
television industry on the other.
Theory of Access Established as a New
"Right to Hear" in Red Lion Case
The case for public access has roots deep in our speech tradition.

21

The First Amendment reads in part that, "Congress shall make no law
. . . .

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . • . • "

22

The First Amendment*s roots are in the classical argument of John Stuart
Mill who thought that only through open discussion is truth discovered^
and spread.

23

As Justice Holmes and Brandeis understood the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression, "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market,"
and in a government of free men, "the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary." Not only
is free speech fundamental; it is paramount, having
been accorded a "preferred" position above all other
constitutional rights because other rights depend so
heavily on free speech.24
More recently the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Holmes-BrAndeis mar
ketplace of ideas theory by declaring in the New York Times case a

21Ibid., p. 219.

22

U.S., Constitution, Amendment I.

23
24

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (People's ed.), 1926, pp. 9-32.

Johnson and Geriock, "Fight for Cable Access," p. 219.
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"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."

25

The legal basis for freedom of speech, access to be heard, unin
hibited marketplace of ideas or whatever acronymn one wishes to use has
been cited in several cases throughout legal history.

26

But in 1969

the Supreme Court in a landmark decision, laid the groundwork for the
newly emerging "doctrine of public access."

The Red Lion

27

case was

the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of the broadcasting industry's
argument that the "Fairness Doctrine" was unconstitutional.

But as a

result of Red Lion broader implications were discussed than just a con
stitutional test of the Fairness Doctrine.
Red Lion reveals an interplay between the older technical
limited access theory, which was justified on the basis
of limitations in the spectrum and the new First Amend
ment based theory of access, which attempts to provide
mechanisms for the interchange of ideas in the dominant
media.28
The Court's decision heavily emphasized maximizing opportunities for
expression.

Some legal scholars contend that the wording in Red Lion

creates a new "right to hear," that is, a constitutional right to more
diversity in the broadcast programming available to the public.

25

29

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., 1964, p. 254.

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S., 1945, pp. 1-20; see
also Packaged Programs v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F. 2d.,
(3rd Cir.), 1958, pp. 708-710.
^ R e d Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 16 P & F Radio Reg., 1969, pp.
708-710.
28

Jerome A. Barron, "Access--The Only Choice for the Media," Texas
Law Review, Vol. 48, 1970, p. 770.
29

Johnson and Gerlock, "Fight for Cable Access," p. 219,
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The Court stated;
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas
and experiences which are crucial here. That right may
not be abridged either by Congress or the FCC.30
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court and emphasized that the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
is paramount.

White stated that "it is the purpose of the First Amend

ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
31
will ultimately prevail.11
The Court relied on the limitation-of-the-spectrum argument for
its concluding opinion; even though advances in technology, such as
microwave transmission, have

led to more efficient utilization of the

frequency spectrum.
On the other hand, the opinion is filled with observations
that give it a radical undertone throughout and that dis
play the constant tension in the opinion, and perhaps in
the Court, between a rationale for broadcast regulation
based on limitations of the spectrum and one based on max
imizing opportunities for e x p r e s s i o n . 32
Although Red Lion does not specifically set forth access provisions,
the implications of a new "right" seem evident.

It is unfortunate,

though, that the words "interest," "need" and "right" are sometimes
used Interchangeably.

The legal implications of a "right" are very

different from the implications of a need or an interest.

33

But the

wording in Red Lion seems to support the point that access to social,
political ideas is a right of the public.

^ R e d Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

p.

2048.

~^Ibid., p. 2047.
■^Barron, "Access--The Only Choice," p. 770.
33Geoffrey L. Thomas, "The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting,"
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 22, 1970, p. 872.
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Advocates of public access not only point to the language of the
Supreme Court opinion, but contend that the inadequacies of the present
broadcasting industry fails to provide a marketplace of ideas.
As Walter Lippmann has noted, the mass media are not par
ticularly well-suited to the dialectical process of finding
truth. Most people listen to radio and television sporad
ically and will not hear the essential evidence and the main
arguments on all sides of an issue. Moreover, the idea
that radio and television currently provide a marketplace
of ideas and that they are producing truth is a myth; if
there is a marketplace, it is at best an imperfect market.
The broadcasting industry does not and cannot provide the
"truth"; even with the best of efforts of most current
broadcasters, the listener must still work vigorously for
it. Distortion by suppression, emphasis and inadequate
depth is endemic to all communication.
In furthering the
"marketplace of ideas," the Court may be attempting to
encourage diversity rather than "truth." There is a pre
sumption that the more ideas available, the better--though
of course at some point more ideas will add to confusion
rather than enlightenment. The current state of broadcast
programming however, is not too many ideas but too f e w . 34
The arguments for public access were founded, again, on philosophical
tenets of the "marketplace of ideas."

The importance of the Red Lion

decision seems to be a move on the part of the Supreme Court to guaran
tee that voices will be heard on electronic communications systems.

But

the marketplace of ideas is much different from the economic marketplace
that governs the present communication's industries.

34Ibl d ., p. 869.
Ibid.. p. 901.
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CHAPTER VI

THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC ACCESS

It is significant to examine the public access experiment in New
York City* not only because it was the first but because it serves as
an example of one city's attempt to implement on a practical basis the
complexities of the common carrier/public access principles,,
In the summer of 1970 two companies were granted franchises by the
City of New York to provide cable television to the Borough of Manhattan.
TelePrompTer, Inc. was awarded the franchise for the area north of 86th
Street on the East Side and 79th Street on the West Side, while the
franchise for the remainder of the borough was granted to Sterling
Manhattan Cable Co.
90,000 homes.^

The two companies were to provide service to about

In exchange for the permission to lay cables in the City

streets, the franchise issued by the Bureau of Franchises, required the
companies to meet specified performance, construction, service delivery
and technical standards.

As this study is being written in late August,

1973, the cable companies in New York City are required to have devel
oped a 24-channel system;

eleven of which may, be allocated to broadcast

signals, one reserved for company use, three reserved to the City, four
for "additional" use and four for public access programming.

Prior to

^__________ , Public Access in New York City; The New York Exper
ience (A Report for the Fund for the City of New York by the Center for
the Analysis of Public Issues), March 1972, p. 2.
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the completion of the present sys tem,seventeen channels were of fered of which
two were set aside for public access.

2

The public access channels are governed by the rules and regula
tions issued by the Bureau of Franchises.

The salient points are:

* There is no charge for public access channel time,
although the companies may charge rentals for studio
and equipment time.
* One of the two channels is reserved for one-time and
"special" users, with special attention being required
for last-minute users.
* The other channel is reserved for regular broadcasts
with a limit of seven hours per week, (two in prime
time) so that regular viewing constituencies can be
developed.
* The companies may require pre-screening of all mater
ial that may lead to legal action against them.
* The companies may require all necessary releases, copy
right clearances, indemnifications, etc., they feel
necessary to protect themselves from l i a b i l i t y , 3
The two cable companies in New York City were optimistic and enthu
siastic about the possibility of public access television for three
primary reasons.

First was the potential of CATV for public service.

As the discussion of cable's potential increased, urban minorities and
poverty became important topics.

The Urban Institute in a proposal to

the Sloan Commission in 1970 projected some of the minority-oriented
services which CATV could provide:

information on health, job opportu

nities, welfare and adult education, drug abuse, legal aid, as well as
enabling general community participation in local affairs.^

Other

2
Jones, R e gulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
Appendix F, p~ 5.
~
...
...
3
__________ , The New York Experience, p. 22.
^__________ , "Potential Uses of Cable Communications in the Inner
City," (Report Prepared for the Urban Institute), November, 1970, pp. 1-10.
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organizations such as Urban Communications Group, headed by Theodore S.
Ledbetter, Jr., the Office of Communication of the United Churches of
Christ, headed by Reverend Everett C. Parker and others organized to
represent the interests of the minorities and the poor in the develop
ment of access to the CATV medium.
A second reason for the enthusiasm of New York City’s two cable
companies was the abundant number of channels CATV could provide.

The

technological problems inherent in multi-channel systems has been dis
cussed previously, but at the onset of cable’s introduction into New
York City these problems were not known, particularly the problem of
"ghost image" caused by tall buildings.

At the time there were numer

ous optimistic speculations about the unlimited number of channels
available on a CATV system.
Finally, the development and marketing of lightx^eight, inexpensive
videotape recorders raised enthusiasm about the possibility of public
access.

The effect of half-inch video equipment in liberating the

production process has been substantial.

5

Sony marketed its first

half-inch Porta-Pak VTR in the summer of 1968,
Prior to this, video tape equipment was cumbersome,
stationary, complex and expensive. Whereas tens of
thousands of dollars were once needed to tool up for
videotape, now only $1495 are required.
In place of
a machine weighing hundreds of pounds and requiring
special power lines, all you need now is standard
house current to recharge batteries which will let you
use the 21-pound system anywhere, independent of exter...... nal power.6
5
Richard Calhoun, Public Television Channels in New York City; The
First Six Months (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy Research, Inc.),
February, 19/2, p. 15.
Michael Shamberg, Guerilla Television (New York:
and Winston, 1971), p. 5.

Holt, Rinehart
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The main advantages of the half-inch Sony Porta-Pak are its cheapness
and simplicity of operation.

It gives public access people the free

dom to go out of the studio and get into the neighborhood.

The sim

plicity of the machine, according to most video culture groups, should
destroy the ’’mystique of expertise’’ surrounding conventional television
production.^
As part of New York City’s promulgation of the rules governing
access, neither cable company charges for channel time for non-commercial
g
presentations though commercial users must pay $125 to $250 per hour.
In addition to the cable time itself, TelePrompTer provides free of
charge the studio equipment and personnel needed to tape and play a
simple one-camera, in-studio program, or to plan a pre-recorded program
in any of the formats for which TelePrompTer has equipment which include
16 mm film,

Sony AV tape, and 1" Ampex 7500 tape.

Additional equip*

ment and technical assistance, even a remote unit, are available at
additional charge.

The arrangements at Sterling Manhattan are similar

with the exception of higher rates charged, partly because of the more
expensive 2” quadriplex tape equipment they use.

9

Evaluation of the Public Access Experience
in New York City
According to all available research to date, there have been only
two comprehensive studies conducted that have evaluated the public access

^Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 16.

8
9

Ibid.

. The New York Experience, p. 7.
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experience in New York City.

One study, Public Access Channels;

The

New York Experience, was published in March, 1972, by the Center for
Analysis of Public Issues.
Channel in New York City:

The second study entitled Public Television
The First Six Months, was extensively re

searched by the Center for Policy Research, Inc. and released in
February, 1972.

The importance of New York City's experiment with

public access was emphasized by both studies in that it represents the
first time in this nation that cable television channels have been set
aside for public use.
Since the development of public access television is
one of the most portentous of the possible new appli
cations of cable technology, and has been the subject
of considerable professional and academic debate, the
New York City experiment clearly warranted careful
analysis.10
It was hoped that public access in New York City would represent "a major step toward the political philosopher's dream of participatory
democracy; the first genuine 'Town Meeting of the Air.
About four months after public access began, the New York Times
stated:
Nearly four months after it began its widely heralded
experiment in electronic democracy, Public Access Tele
vision in New York is barely mumbling in the variegated
community accents for which it was designed.
-Although the New York Times was rarely encouraging, there were numerous
^obstacles to the full development and use of public access facilities.
As the report researched by the Center for Policy Research stated:

U-A
1
Ibid.,
p . 1.

1 0 T

^Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 47.
12

New York Times, October 26, 1971.

100
First, people simply didn't know about public access and
how simple it was to use; secondly, even where known,
without encouragement the public would adopt a reticent
attitude on the grounds that TV was only for the wealthy
and influential; thirdly, that public access was such a
new and highly localized phenomenon that there were no
model program formats available; fourthly, there were not
enough skilled production assistants available in spite of
TelePrompTer's offer of technical advice during "reasonable"
hours; fifthly, there was a paucity of equipment and
editing facilities that could only become more pronounced
as the demand for channel time increased; and sixthly, the
programming groups were from the outset being blocked from
one traditional means of financing production costs, that
is, local advertising, by a rule requiring programmers to
turn over 1007. of all monies derived from such sources to
1^
the companies•
The slow start of the public access experiment was not so much the
restrictive rules as it was the lack of understanding of the necessary
planning needed to get public television started.

Many of the public

access advocates didn't fully understand the difficulties inherent in
attempting so set-up such an operation.
For instance, many people assume that since there are so
many groups that seem to be making a tremendous amount of
public noise of their desire for access that once access
is there that people will just sort of step forth and
flood the stations.
But the response to public access fell short of "flooding the stations."
After the opening ceremonies on July 1, 1971, very few groups or individuals made use of public access.

15

John Sanfratello,Director of Public

Access for Sterling, commented:
I don't think the people that brought up the suggestion
of public access really knew what the hell they were
talking about.
I‘ don't think they had insight enough to

13
Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 38.
*^Ibid., p. 48.
1-5T * ‘
Ibid.
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look at it and say "You know, w e ’re starting something
that our wildest imaginations never even thought about."
Well, they should have given it some consideration be
fore it started, not wait until it was on, and then
decide, "Okay, now we have it, what are we going to do
with it?" or "How, who, will be paying for this?"^^
On the other hand, Ms. "Red" Burns of the New York University Alter
nate Media Center has taken the position that public access could not
and would not be an immediate success, no matter what kind of planning
had gone into it prior to implementation.

Ms. Burns' reasoning is based

on the argument that the only evaluational index by which public access
can be assessed is that traditionally applied to broadcast television.
This scale is inapplicable to public access television because the dom
inant characteristic in its make-up is scarcity of time, a factor which
severely limits access to broadcast TV.
This scarcity factor is certainly not a feature of poly
channelled CATV, and so such time-honored devices as
audience ratings are no longer applicable to the measure
of success.^
Yet such devices and expectations remain a part of the evaluational
apparatus.
The educational or awareness problem was also immense.

Most people

never conceive of themselves as Using television for their own purposes.
They are too used to be acted upon by the medium.

"Television is still

a land of electronic wizards and technical mysteries; the demystifica
tion will take time."^

16Ibid., p. 49.
^ Ibid., p. 50.
' - '■■■-

_______

'

■ ■

■

,The New York Experience, p. 33.
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The Limitations of Ha If-Inch Video Equipment;
Chapter two of this study examined some of the technological prob
lems in multi-channel cable systems.

The New York City experience seems

to clearly manifest some of these limitations.
The frustrating incompatibilities between tape units, the
poor transmission quality of low-cost equipment, the lack
of flexibility in the cable system itself, all make non
studio public access presentations unnecessarily complex
and occasionally impossible.19
Public access advocates speculated that the inexpensive, portable
video equipment would take television into the neighborhoods.

Unfor

tunately, there are a number of problems with half-inch equipment which
at times limit

its users to the production of esthetically inferior,

non-transmit table (over cable) tap’es.

John Sanfratello, Director of

Public Access for Sterling, commented that technically there are a tremendous number of problems with the signals recorded on half-inch tape.

20

The amplifiers are not built to correct technical errors in half-inch
tape.

So a cable company either refuses to transmit the signal, or if

they do, the picture is very inferior, to the point according to
Sanfratello, "that I don't think that very many people will watch it
for a great length of time.

21

It is felt among those working with half-inch tape that its chief
limitation is the impossibility of editing, unless it is dubbed
onto more expensive (and less available) one-or-two-inch tapes.

Attempts

at electronic editing onto second generation half-inch tape will not

19-Ibid.

20
Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 18,
"

21

Ibid.

■

..................
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transmit at all, while trigger editing (stopping and starting the camera
during taping) produces "glitches" or tape break-ups with each on-off
action.

22

The easiest solution to the editing problem is to shoot in

real time“-that is, just let the recorder run without interruption,
recording everything that goes on.

Another suggested method is to edit

half-inch tape and then have it shot off a TV monitor in a studio.

The

only problem is that this method requires the cable operator to make
permanently available, a properly aligned camera and monitor.
As yet,

no

technical

to half-inch video equipment.
could be established.

23

standards have been formulated applicable
It is questionable whether any standards

The cable system's modulators and amplifiers are

capable of transmitting "quality" signals on regular studio tape (one-ortwo-inch), but not on half-inch.

As a result of those considerations,

the technical end of public access is still uncertain.

New York Public Television Channels Require
Continuous Financial Support
Probably the most crucial of all problems that New York City public
access groups faced was that of financing.

Although usage of public

access channels was slow during the summer, it picked up considerably
during September and October, 1971.

Most of the programming was gen

erated by such groups as the Alternate Media Center, Filmmaker's Cooper
ative, Friends of Haiti, The Federation of New York Tenants Organization,
Raindance and the like.

22Ibid., p. 19.
23

Ibid.

With the possible exception of Raindance, none

of the groups had any significant financial resources.

Most of the

production costs were borne by grants and fellowships.

Without adequate

provisions in the franchise granted by a city to a cable company for
continuing support, public access may be stunted, if not halted.

25

The

different programming experiences of TelePrompTer and Sterling demon
strate that free channel time, by itself, is not enough to generate
significant spontaneous usage.
Under the proposed FCC rules allowing charges for produc
tion facilities, for instance, the Alternate Media Center
and Global Village will still get on the cable, but Philip
Jordan, Marvin Tobak and the Friends of Haiti will be shut
out.26
Under the 1972 Cable Television Report and Order the FCC stipulates that
cities can now charge a 5 percent franchise fee only if the city can show
just cause.

As of yet none of the city franchise agreements that have

stipulated a franchise fee have channeled this money into supporting
public access.
Liability Problem Fails>
to be Significant
The New York experience with public access provides an example of
how one cable system dealt with the legal hassles of liability.

Sterling

Cable Company's initial response was to draft a strongly-worded indemnif
ication contract which would bind the public channel user to hold the
cable company harmless in the event of suit, to pay for all legal expenses

__________ , The New York Experience, pp. 9-12.
25

Thomas Freebain, "Public Access in New York City:
An Interview
“with Theadora Sklover," Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2,
1972, p. 236.
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and all judgments incurred by the cable company, and any other cable
system which carried the program and to allow the cable company to hire
counsel and appeal decisions virtually without limit.

This contract,

which is of doubtful enforceability anyhow, was never signed by any users
of Sterling's public channels.

27

Out of protection, the City rules require that the cable companies
receive material two weeks in advance of screening, but the companies
have been satisfied with submission 48 hours in advance, or even less
. ,
•
28
in some cases.
One proposal that was submitted to the Sterling Cable Company was
to require programmers on the public channels to post a bond to assure
that such liability could be met by them.

This proposal was ignored

because it was unfeasible.
This is an unsound, even astounding, suggestion. No
other communicator has to show solvency in order to
speak or write. The very advantage of cable is to per
mit low-cost access, and it would be inconsistent with
that objective to impose a means test. Furthermore,
bonding would be a disproportionstej^ burdensome condition,
since liability would rarely arise.
Other proposals were reviewed by the two cable companies as there was
great concern over the liability issue.

"In actual fact, liability prob-

lems have not so far been a major obstacle to programming."

30

The only instances of censorship we have found to date
was the deletion of an unusually explicit sexual scene
and a refusal to show a film entirely about copulation.

^ I b i d ., p. 28.
28Ibid., p. 27.
29

Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 31.

30
__________ , The New York Experience, p. 27.
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Cfci other occasions, they have permitted shots of genitalia,
and raised no objection to the extremely candid presentation
by Consumers' Union on flammable clothing, with specific
identification of manufacturers and retailers of flammable
items.31
Both evaluation studies conducted on the experience in New York
City with public television cautioned about generalizing from the exper
ience in New York City to other localities.

The current level of public

access programming was certainly facilitated by the unusual media sophis
tication of the New York users and the presence of a relatively large
number of videotape groups and "media freaks," with amazing technical
competence.

This phenomena may be peculiar to the largest cities in

the country, or possibly just to New York.
All in all, however, for all the shortcomings and prob
lems to date, the New York City experience has been a
heartening one. The overwhelming fact is that the channels
are being used, spontaneously, by relatively large num
bers of people, and for a variety of purposes.
Issues of
censorship and liability appear to be fading somewhat in
importance as people concentrate on the business of pro
ducing material for the channels. Program personnel at
the cable companies have already remarked on the growing
discrimination that users are beginning to show about
organizing information for the most effective visual com
munication. While this is no assurance, of course, that
public access television has started on the right path, an
encouraging number of signs seem to be pointing in the right
J•
x.•/ 'v n 32

31Ibid.
33Ibid., p. 36.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The task of organizing and defining the complex technological,
economic and political factors of a common carrier community antenna
television system is unquestionably difficult.

But out of the maze

of regulatory contradictions, technological and economic uncertainty
which this study has disclosed, several concepts appear to emerge.
Cable television was the unexpected by-product of gaps in program,
coverage caused by the failure of the FCC to define goals and establish
policy before economic forces became too powerful to resist.
The FCC provides an excellent example of what happens to an or
ganization or agency which has not perceived its long range goals.
When faced by a challenge whose technology advances at a faster pace
than its bureaucracy that agency has two options; impose a freeze or
surrender.

The FCC has not surrendered.

The Commission has been so

preoccupied x^ith promoting program diversity and protecting local
broadcast endeavors in spectrum broadcasting that it has failed to
recognize that cable television could possibly fulfill these goals
better than any other medium.

Thus far the FCC's regulation of CATV

has been based solely upon the degree of threat an industry poses for
another rather than development of its own innate qualities.

The capa

bilities of cable television systems to perform various communication
roles in a regulatory design allowing their unique flexibility to sup
plement and enhance existing spectrum services has been almost
107

108
completely ignored by the FCC.

This has occurred because of the lack

of understanding of the legal characteristics and economic potential
of a cable operation.

As a result the FCC has been able to measure

cable only in terms of its effect upon a known quantity““spectrum
broadcasting.
Throughout broadcast history the FCC has made several attempts
to structure a new broadcasting system upon a concept of local service
by local broadcasters and thereby promoting program diversity.

A case

in point is the Commission’s obsession with the healthy survival of UHF
broadcasting.

But in nearly every attempt the Commission's hopes have

been frustrated by the harsh realities of the marketing structure.
In the case of spectrum broadcasting the FCC was forcing a local broad
cast pattern upon an industry whose program and revenue distribution
structures were largely formed by radio experience and upon a popula
tion less

predictable than the demographic data which it relied upon.
0
Despite FCC decrees, local television stations were not economically
suited to

provide

local oriented programming and despite FCC hopes,

the public seemed less concerned with local coverage than network
entertainment programming.
It is doubtful, though, whether the FCC really has hoped for
successful- local broadcast programming.
staffed, inefficient organization.

The FCC is at best an under

The Commission seems to pay lip

service to these hopes and considerations, but on a day-to-day admin
istrative basis these idealistic goals do not appear to influence
Commission decisions in particular cases.
in our democratic system.

The FCC represents a fluke

So often in the regulatory process those
"\

being regulated soon 7:ise to become the regulator simply because th-_*
are the only ones who know what 5s happening*

The Commission members

depend heavily on broadcasters for a large portion of their research and
on Congress which supervises their activiti.es, for their funds*

Within

this organizational structure it seems clear why the Commission is concerned with protecting the economic status of the regulated group*
ministrative policy-making, by virtue of the number of factors
which must be weighed, requires^T^nkisiderable lead time over economic
trends and technological development.

This seems especially true in

■■

the field of mass communication regulation with its complex public
interest criterion.

When the FCC attempts to implement this criterion

it points to the Communication Act as the foundation for decision
making*

But the Communications Act, unlike the Interstate Commerce

Act, as an example, is not designed to prevent the wasteful results of
competition, block price wars or duplication of services; it simply
allocates a scarce resource among competing applicants.

The Communi

cations Act has not served as an adequate regulatory tool to handle
the economic and technological complexities which have emerged throughout
broadcast history.
When these factors are considered it is perhaps easier to under
stand why the FCC has been unable to see either the local service or
diversity of programming aspects in terms of CATV.

The Commission has

the capacity of administering broadcast issues, but it does not seem
to have the capacity to regulate electronic mass communications effec
tively in the years ahead without considerable augmentation of its
research ability.
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There is a chance that the misdirected, myopic vision of the Cornmission can be altered.

Probably for the first time in the history of

electronic communication,.the technological developments are not com
pletely ahead of the planned use.

By 1977 all cable companies in the

top 100 markets must have systems with 20-channel capacity.

Some of

these channels must be utilized on a common carrier or public access
basis,

But until that time, cable television for all practical purposes

is a limited-access medium.
bothered to consider.

This is a crucial point few persons have

Although potentially cable television has un-

.

limited channel access this is not a technological reality and it may
not be for quite some time.

There are several reception problems that

must be worked out before cable can deliver a clear signal over a multi
channel system.
The FCC has stated time and again that it will return to the com
mon carrier issue as the industry develops.

But unless the Commission

formulates guidelines now it is doubtful whether it will face CATV
common carrier operations with any greater skill than it has displayed
in the past.

Perhaps the FCC often procrastinates on important decision

making policies because of the heavy workload required of this under
staffed organization.

There are too few manpower resources to adequately

research the vast areas of communication which the FCC oversees.
One recommendation this study indicates would be to establish a
new administrative commission that would deal exclusively with commu
nity antenna television.

There is an inherent risk in establishing a

new administrative organization; that it will merely emulate the pol
icies of its predecessor or serve the economic interest Of those who
oversee its activities.

To alleviate some of the danger this newly-

Ill
established Cable Commission should specify membership requirements.
The Cable Commission should have an odd number of members, say seven,
of which not more than three would be directly related or employed by
the CATV industry.

At least two members should represent a minority

group, one member should have economic and legal expertise and another
should be drawn from the business profession.

The commission members

would be appointed by the President and approved by Congress.

The

function of this new Cable Commission would be tos 'a) adequately
research areas of cable before policies are established, b) formulate ,
flexible guidelines for economic aspects of CATV, c) establish minimum
technical standards and tests of performance, d) hold public hearings
prior to any major, long-range decision making policy, and e) issue
licenses and compliance certificates.
Realistically the establishment of a new commission will take a
great deal of time.

But it is essential that "objective" research get

underway now so that when cable operators begin common carrier opera
tions their efforts will not be subject to bureaucratic indecisiveness
and hazy guidelines.

No institution has the perspect5.ve to criticize

itself adequately; outside consultants with different perspectives
must be used,

A research team should be appointed comprised of scholars

economically unrelated to the broadcast industry, to thoroughly in
vestigate the regulatory, economic and technological aspects of common
carrier CATV.

This research investigation should have four basic

goals.
The researchers should determine the technological feasibility of
common carrier access to cable television,

The numerous technological
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problems that have arisen in multi-channel systems may make common
carrier status impossible in some markets until devices or techniques
can be developed to eliminate reception problems.

There is a great

deal of sophisticated broadcast equipment in the developing stages,
but it must be economically marketable so as not to pose a burden on
cable operators.

Technical standards should be established for half-

inch video equipment,

Even with the best time base synchronizing

equipment, half-inch remains an inferior broadcast product.

Compati

bilities between half-inch machines and studio playback units should
be developed.
Long-range economic policies that will serve as guidelines for the
top fifty markets, the second top fifty markets and the remaining markets
should be determined.

It is important that common carrier economic

guidelines be formulated for each market classification because the
economics of a major market like New York are much different from the
economics of a market like Albuquerque.

The issue of rate regulation

is particularly crucial to common carrier operations.
at the state level has been a dismal failure.

Rate regulation

Overregulation has

almost halted cable growth in the states that assume regulatory respon
sibilities over CATV.

Economic guidelines for common carrier cable TV

will be extremely difficult to research.

The market structures and

economic formulas have been largely determined.

But if the research

effort can make the cable markets aware of the economic pitfalls and of
the options available, perhaps it will prevent the haphazard way state
and local governments and cable systems have approached the issue of
cable economics in the past.

This information should be made readily

available before communities embark on the franchising process.
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The research investigation should place the hypothetical fears of
possible conflicts between cable operators as program originators and
as common carriers on the same system into realistic perspective.
It seems that many of these unsettled issues such as liability and pos
sible program conflicts have been generated to halt progress toward
achieving common carrier access to CATV.

There is great risk in for

mulating long-range common carrier program guidelines on hypothetical
information.
The last major goal of the research team should be an extensive
examination of the New York experiment with public access.

Although

the New York experience may indeed be unique, it at least represents
a model to examine.

The two studies conducted thus far have merely

examined the first layer.

The notable success of New York*s public

channels may be due in part to the numerous cultural facilities,
diverse minority groups and educational centers upon which the public
access groups could draw.

But could a smaller, less culturally-diverse

metropolitan area or community support a similar effort?
access experiment should be tried in a smaller market.

A public
In some areas

common carrier operations may prove to be impossible to sustain on
either an economic or programming basis.
vision program is a back-breaking effort.

To produce a one hour tele
The 1972 cable rules specify

a government channel, an educational channel or local access channel.
To date no research has been conducted to determine if enough program
ming can be generated at a local level to fill this time.

An

examination of the New York experience should offer suggestions to
other communities on how to make citizens aware of public access and
most importantly how to raise funds to channel franchise fees into the
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financing of public channels.
These four goals by no means represent all the aspects that need
to be investigated,

A foremost consideration of a common carrier cable

research team or any futureregulatory body should be that common carrier
and public access could hold the premise of providing a near-perfect
local broadcast service which the FCC has spent years promoting. Some
persons fear granting minority access to a broadcast medium that has been
traditionally reserved for the middle and upper classes.

This is why

many efforts to sustain public access have been discouraged.

But if

goals of a political nature are placed above all other factors as the
FCC has done in the past, the result will be a stifling of the natural
economic and technological development of common carrier CATV.
Future modes of program delivery may face the same type of repres
sion CATV has experienced.

Laser beam or direct satellite broadcast

links may pose future threats to CATV.

The FCC, as now constituted,

does not seem adept at facing new challenges with any greater insight
than manifested in the past.

There is a need for a new regulatory

agency that has the time and resources to adequately project long-range
goals and formulate policy.

Cable television is not the last, but

rather the first in a series of electronic transmission techniques of
the future which will require a thorough and perceptive consideration
of the proper regulatory action.
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